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A PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL FOR APPLYING LOST 
CHANCE THEORY TO PROBABILISTIC INJURIES IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
PAUL M. SECUNDA• 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, a growing number of federal courts 1 have begun 
to utilize the "loss of a chance" remedial approach2 to determine the 
value of probabilistic injuries3 in competitive hiring and promotion cases 
in the employment discrimination context. 4 Under this approach, courts 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. I 
would like to thank Michael D. Green, Mike Zimmer, and Farish Percy for their 
thoughtful insights and constructive suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. I would 
also like to commend the research assistance of Jeff Farrar, Mississippi Law School 
Class of 2003, and David Splaingard and Robin Samson, both of the University of 
Mississippi Law School Class of 2005. Finally, I dedicate this piece to my wife, Mindy 
Young-Secunda, without whom I would accomplish little. 
1. See Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The loss of a 
chance] basis for an award of damages is not accepted in all jurisdictions, but it is 
gaining ground .... "). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has taken 
the lead in applying lost chance theory to employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., 
Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 2004); Bishop v. Gainer, 272 
F.3d 1009, 1015-17 (7th Cir. 2001); Doll, 75 F.3d at 1205-07. 
2. The "loss of a chance" remedial approach, or "lost chance theory," is only 
one type of recognized proportional liability scheme. MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE FUTURE 
OF PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY 6 n.13 (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper 
No. 04-14, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=610563 (to be published in 
EXPLORING TORT LAw (Stuart Maddened.) (forthcoming Aug. 2005)); Lars Noah, An 
Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REv. 
LITIG. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=646084 ("'[L]oss of a chance' represents just one facet of 
broader debates about probabilistic evidence and proportional recovery in tort law."). 
See generally John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion 
Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1063 (1989). Although there are 
other proportionality schemes, such as "market-share" and "increased risk 
enhancement," see GREEN, supra, at 6, this Article discusses only lost chance theory 
and its appropriateness in the employment discrimination context. 
3. A "probabilistic injury," as used in this Article, refers to an injury that not 
only cannot be established with absolute certainty (like most injuries), but also is one for 
which statistical evidence permits an enhanced evaluation of the relevant probabilities. 
See GREEN, supra note 2, at 5, 7, 64. Probabilistic injuries in the employment 
discrimination context generally oecur in the competitive hiring or promotion settings. 
See Doll, 75 F.3d at 1206. In these types of cases, it is possible to marshal statistical 
likelihoods to determine the probabilities of a plaintiff having received the competitive 
position in the first instance. See infra Part IV .B.2. 
4. Because of the uncertainties assoeiated with competitive hiring and 
promotion cases, lost chance theory has been considered particularly apt in this context. 
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discount the value of a job by the probability that the discriminated-
against plaintiff would have received a competitive position in the 
absence of discrimination.5 For example, if a court fmds that a plaintiff 
had only a 25% chance of receiving a promotion in the absence of 
discrimination, the plaintiff is awarded 25% of the value of that job. 6 
Chief Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, a chief proponent of implementing the lost chance 
theory in this employment discrimination context, has argued 
persuasively that such a remedial scheme leads to "more just and 
equitable results"7 than solely relying upon a "causation inquiry [which] 
has traditionally had an aU-or-nothing effect on the outcome of a tort 
claim."8 
Nevertheless, the application of lost chance theory to these types of 
employment discrimination cases is not free from controversy. 9 Critics 
Doll, 75 F.3d at 1206. As the Seventh Circuit wrote in Doll: "It strikes us as peculiarly 
appropriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion [to apply the lost 
chance theory]. In such a case the plaintiffs chances are inherently uncertain because of 
the competitive setting." !d. Whether lost chance theory may apply outside of this 
subset of employment discrimination cases is beyond the scope of this Article. 
5. See id.; Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in 
Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 
YALE L.J. 1353, 1354, 1356 (1980); see also AmyL. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 
74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1220 (1999). 
Under a probabilistic scheme, each plaintiff is awarded an amount 
proportional to the calculated expected contribution of the actionable 
cause ... to the decision in his case. "The proportionality rule discounts 
recovery by the probability that the plaintiffs loss was caused by some other 
wrongdoer, by a nonculpable source, or by the plaintiff." 
Wax, supra, at 1220 (quoting David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass 
Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 881 
(1984)). 
6. See Doll, 75 F. 3d at 1206 (setting forth a hypothetical example of how lost 
chance theory applies in the employment discrimination context). As will be discussed 
in greater detail below, the 25% loss of chance derives from the fact that the individual 
had a 25% chance of obtaining the position prior to the discrimination and a 0% chance 
once discriminatorily denied. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
7. See Doll, 75 F.3d at 1207. 
8. King, supra note 5, at 1356. 
9. See Wax, supra note 5, at 1224-25 (presenting a critique of probabilistic 
recoveries in employment discrimination cases). Indeed, application of lost chance 
theory beyond the medical malpractice context continues to be somewhat unsettled. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 
26 cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002); see also David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for 
Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 605, 610 (2001) (observing that use of loss 
of a chance is controversial in tort law generally because it is seen as undermining the 
traditional requirement that damages be proven by a preponderance of the evidence); 
Jonathan P. Kieffer, The Case for Across-the-Board Application of the Loss-of-Chance 
Doctrine, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 568, 568 (1997) ("[T]he loss-of-chance doctrine results in 
significant inequities for defendants."); Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical 
Malpractice: A Look at Recent Developments, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 301, 311 (2003) 
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claim that it is sheer speculation to quantify the probability of a given 
individual receiving a competitive position in the absence of 
discrimination. 10 Unlike the medical malpractice context in which lost 
chance theory is more commonly utilized, 11 and where estimations 
concerning the chance of surviving a deadly disease are based upon past 
medical experiences of doctors treating patients with similar 
conditions, 12 the employment context provides no such convenient data 
to consult. 13 
Even so, the absence of convenient evidence should not diminish 
the basic soundness of the lost chance approach to probabilistic injuries 
in competitive hiring and promotion cases. 14 Echoing Judge Posner to a 
substantial degree, this Article contends that, although uncertainty will 
inevitably challenge fact finders to fix percentages for these employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, 15 such uncertainty is not insuperable, and is, in 
(maintaining that the loss of chance doctrine fundamentally alters causation and lowers 
the burden of proof in medical malpractice cases). Even so, lost chance theory has made 
significant inroads in the medical malpractice context in the last twenty-five years or so. 
See GREEN, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("For the most part, courts have followed Professor 
King's suggestion that the harm be reconceptualized as a lost opportunity for cure rather 
than by adopting proportional liability for the adverse outcome."). 
10. See Wax, supra note 5, at 1134 (arguing that in the unconscious bias 
context, "[a] probabilistic system will justify itself neither in producing well-calibrated 
risk reduction nor in directing compensation to the right persons"). 
11. Fischer, supra note 9, at 605 ("Tort lawyers in the United States often 
think of 'loss of a chance' as a theory of 'probabilistic causation' that only applies to 
medical malpractice misdiagnosis cases."). 
12. See id. at 649 (arguing that chance calculations can be based on scientific 
studies that depend on the etiology of a disease or the characteristics of an injury); King, 
supra note 5, at 1386 ("One may deduce the probability figure [in medical malpractice 
cases] from so-called 'relative frequency' by looking at the way in which the same or 
similar forces operated in the past."). But see GREEN, supra note 2, at 66 ("I wonder 
about the quality of evidence employed even in medical malpractice lost opportunity 
cases."). 
13. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("The difference between employment 
discrimination and medical and other forms of personal-injury tort is that the relevant 
probabilities may be more difficult to compute in the employment setting."). The 
bewildering array of permutations in calculating the probability of an applicant or 
employee receiving a job exists as a result of competing candidates' overlapping skill 
sets, numerous personality types (among both candidates and those who hire them), as 
well as other subjective intangibles, which play differing roles in deciding whether an 
individual will receive a job or promotion in a competitive circumstance. See Griffin v. 
Mich. Dep't of Corr., 5 F.3d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1993); Bryson B. Moore, South 
Carolina Rejects the Lost Chance Doctrine, 48 S.C. L. REv. 201, 214 (1996) ("A major 
problem with extending the doctrine to other fields is the greater difficulty in 
ascertaining the percentage chance lost."). 
14. For a discussion on how probabilities can nevertheless still be determined 
in employment discrimination cases, see infra notes 229-38 and accompanying text. 
15. Indeed, all cases involve some degree of uncertainty. GREEN, supra note 
2, at 5 ("Evidence is never perfect; uncertainty always exists."). 
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fact, a traditional feature of employment discrimination remedies. 16 
That being said, this Article does part company with Judge Posner over 
whether a "pure" or "symmetrical" version of lost chance theory17 
should be applied to so-called "better-than-even" chance cases. 18 
In its place, this Article advocates for, based upon statutory19 and 
prudentiaf0 reasons, a public interest model for applying lost chance 
theory in the employment discrimination context.21 Under this hybrid 
16. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977). 
"After the victims [of discrimination] have been identified, the court must, as nearly as 
possible, 'recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been 
no' unlawful discrimination." /d. (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 
747, 769 (1976)). This process of recreating the past will necessarily involve a degree 
of approximation and imprecision. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1207 ("Yet no less uncertainty 
attends the efforts of triers of fact to fix the percentage of a plaintiffs negligence in a 
tort case governed, as most tort cases are today, by the rule of comparative 
negligence.") (citations omitted). For a discussion on whether an appropriate analogy 
exists between comparative negligence and lost chance theory, see infra note 77. 
17. By "pure" or "symmetrical," this Article means a version of lost chance 
theory that advances an across-the-board application of lost chance theory in both high-
probability and low-probability employment discrimination cases. Doll, 15 F.3d at 
1205-06. Bur see Michelle L. Truckor, Comment, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal 
Recovery for Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REv. 349, 351 (1999) 
(arguing for an asymmetrical pure lost chance theory in the tort context). Thus, an 
applicant with a 75% chance of being hired would receive 75% of the value of the job if 
successful in making out a claim of employment discrimination, not the entire amount as 
under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206; see also infra 
note 22. 
18. In "better-than-even" chance cases, a term coined by Professor Joseph 
King, a plaintiff has shown that she had a better-than-even chance of securing a 
favorable result in the absence of the defendant's wrongdoing. King, supra note 5, at 
1387. Traditionally, most courts in better-than-even chance cases value the better-than-
even chance as though it had materialized or was certain to do so and award the full 
value of the job. See id. In contrast, both King and Chief Judge Richard Posner of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit advocate pure lost chance theory under 
which damages are discounted in all cases in order to promote a more accurate loss 
allocation. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206; King, supra note 5, at 1387; see also Truckor, 
supra note 17, at 359. 
19. See infra Part III.A. 
20. See infra Part III.B. 
21. Indeed, the impetus behind this public interest approach derives in part 
from a recent empirical observation made by Professor Michael Selmi. Michael Selmi, 
The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination 
Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1249, 1252 (2003). In analyzing 
employment discrimination class action lawsuits, Sclmi found that "[t]here is no longer 
any concerted effort to eliminate discrimination; instead, efforts are directed at providing 
monetary compensation for past discrimination without particular concern for preventing 
future discrimination, or even remedying past discrimination, through injunctive relief." 
/d. The public interest model to lost chance theory in employment discrimination 
described in this Article is one attempt to revitalize the important public-regarding 
aspects of employment discrimination law; albeit through the use of a type of equitable 
monetary relief rather than through injunctive structural change as Selmi advocates. See 
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approach, lost chance theory will be applied in low probability cases 
where the plaintiff cannot prove a better-than-even chance of having 
received the position in the absence of discrimination, whereas the 
traditional "aU-or-nothing approach "22 will apply in high probability, 
better-than-even chance cases. 23 This approach is based on the explicit 
recognition that employment discrimination law, unlike traditional tort 
law, seeks not only to make victims of discrimination whole, 24 but also 
to vindicate the statutory mandate of eradicating all unlawful 
discrimination from the economy. 25 As a consequence, the public 
id. at 1300; see also infra Part liLA. 
22. As used throughout this Article, the traditional "aU-or-nothing approach" 
refers to a system in which "[c]ompensation is awarded if the plaintiff proves causation 
and other elements of liability by a designated standard of proof, which in civil actions is 
a preponderance of the evidence." Wax, supra note 5, at 1212; see also Truckor, supra 
note 17, at 354. 
23. See Lori R. Ellis, Note, Loss of Chance as Technique: Toeing the Line at 
Fifty Percent, 72 TEX. L. REv. 369, 372 (1993) (advocating a similar hybrid approach to 
lost chance theory in the medical malpractice context). 
24. See Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of Chance 
Doctrine: An Argument for a New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 15 
(2002) ("Though the law of torts has many goals, its primary function is to determine 
when compensation for a harm caused should be required."). 
25. Although one of the primary purposes of tort law is also deterrence, see 
Wax, supra note 5, at 1132-33, tort law seeks to find the appropriate balance of activity 
and risk. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 62 (describing the law and economics literature in 
tort law based on the idea "that if actors bear just the right amount of liability for the 
harm they cause, we will reach an optimal balance between accident costs and 
prevention costs"). Judge Learned Hand's famous formula of B < PL for determining 
whether to engage in risky behavior is based on this balance. See United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (stating that an actor's duty "to 
provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables ... if the probability be 
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than 
L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL"). /d. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ("Title VII"), on the other hand, engages in no such balance, and bans outright all 
unlawful forms of employment discrimination based on a legislative determination that 
there is no social value to any of the proscribed forms of employment discrimination. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer-(!) to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin .... "). Not just deterrence, but eradication of unlawful employment 
discrimination from the workplace is the ultimate goal of laws like Title VII. See Franks 
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,771 (1976) ("[T]he denial of seniority relief to 
victims of illegal racial discrimination in hiring is permissible 'only for reasons which, if 
applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating 
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered 
through past discrimination.'") (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 
421 (1975)) (emphasis added); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. 
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 292 (2002) (recognizing that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the statutory authority to vindicate both the 
private and public interests served by Title VII). 
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interest model permits punitive-like equitable relief26 against employers 
as an additional way to effectuate the statutory mandate animating 
employment discrimination law. 27 
The public interest model will have beneficial effects in at least two 
important respects. First, it will promote additional deterrence even 
where the employee is unable to prove a better-than-even chance of 
receiving a position in the absence of discrimination, thereby eliminating 
the possibility of a discriminating employer being found completely 
blameless in circumstances in which unlawful conduct is clearly 
involved. 28 Second, and simultaneously, this modified approach will 
provide additional incentives for employers to take preventive actions to 
avoid liability, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in recent 
employment discrimination cases.29 
Critics of this model will no doubt argue that this approach is 
inconsistent with the loss allocation goals of tort law, 30 and that such an 
approach will needlessly overcompensate plaintiffs in a punitive 
manner. 31 In response, this Article makes a two-prong defense. First, 
these critics place too much emphasis on the private, "make whole" 
relief function of employment discrimination law, while paying 
insufficient heed to plausibly the more important public policy goals of 
these laws. 32 Secondly, and connected with the first point, the 
26. This Article will contend that "punitive-type" equitable relief is different in 
kind and nature than traditional punitive damages (which are awarded in employment 
discrimination law cases under the now familiar Kolstad framework). See infra notes 
184-86 and accompanying text. 
27. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294-95 ("[W]hile punitive damages benefit 
the individual employee, they also serve an obvious public function in deterring future 
violations.") (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,266-70 (1981)). 
28. See Doll, 75 F. 3d at 1206 (promoting the lost chance theory in employment 
discrimination cases as a way to prevent undercompensation and underdeterrence). 
29. In both Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. E/lerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court 
adopted a modified vicarious liability approach in order to give employers incentives to 
take preventive and corrective actions regarding sexual harassment in the workplace. 
See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2345 (2004) ("[In Faragher and 
E/lerth,] the Court ... recognized that a liability limitation linked to an employer's 
effort to install effective grievance procedures and an employee's effort to report 
harassing behavior would advance Title VII's conciliation and deterrence purposes.") 
(citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The proposed 
remedial approach in this Article satisfies these same prophylactic interests. See infra 
notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
30. See King, supra note 5, at 1387. 
31. See Wax, supra note 5, at 1134. 
32. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418; see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 779 
n.40 (1976) ("'[C]laims under Title VII involve the vindication of a major public 
interest ... . '") (quoting a section-by-section analysis accompanying the EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 CONFERENCE REPORT, 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 
7168 (1972)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
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concededly pumttve aspects of overcompensating plaintiffs in better-
than-even chance cases should be embraced, rather than rejected, as 
being consistent with the broader statutory mandate of these laws: to 
protect the public from the insidious consequences of discriminatory 
employer conduct.33 In all, the public interest model is most consistent 
with the "central statutory purposes"34 served by federal 
antidiscrimination legislation. 35 
This Article presents the public interest model for applying lost 
chance theory to probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination 
cases in four parts. Part I explores the underlying mechanics of pure 
lost chance theory as developed by Professor Joseph King, as well as its 
first important practical tort application in the seminal case Herskovits v. 
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound. 36 Part II then evaluates 
Judge Posner's suggestion that pure lost chance theory should apply to 
probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination cases, as well as the 
theory's subsequent adoption by the Seventh Circuit in the employment 
discrimination cases of Bishop v. Gainerl1 and Biondo v. City of 
Chicago. 38 Part III asserts that pure lost chance theory conflicts with 
both statutory and prudential concerns underlying federal employment 
discrimination laws. To remedy these deficiencies, Part IV advances a 
public interest model for applying lost chance theory to probabilistic 
injuries in competitive hiring and promotion cases, thus providing a 
more consistent approach with regard to the public policy underlying the 
employment discrimination laws. 
33. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 295. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 
Waffle House: 
/d. 
we are persuaded that, pursuant to Title VII and the [Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990], whenever the EEOC chooses from among the 
many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular 
case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply 
provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely 
victim-specific relief. 
34. See supra note 25. 
35. By federal antidiscrimination legislation, this Article has in mind statutes 
like the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); the Age id. U.S.C. § 791; 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 ("Section 1981 "); Title VII, id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), id. §§ 12101-12117. 
36. 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en bane). 
37. 272 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2001). 
38. 382 F. 3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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I. THE RUDIMENTS OF LOST CHANCE THEORY 
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings: Separating Causationfrom 
Valuation 
In his seminal piece on lost chance theory, King complained that 
courts in tort cases were guilty of applying the concept of causation 
improperly to matters of valuation. 39 Whereas causation concerns "the 
cause and effect relationship that must be established between tortious 
conduct and a loss before liability for that loss may be imposed, "40 
valuation involves "the process of identifying and measuring the loss 
that was caused by the tortious conduct. "41 Put more succinctly, 
whereas causation concerns whether a plaintiff should recover for a loss, 
valuation concerns how much the plaintiff should recover for a loss. 42 
Nevertheless, many courts today still follow an ali-or-nothing 
approach43 under which the interest in a favorable outcome is either 
redressed completely or completely ignored. 44 In other words, these 
courts treat "the chance of avoiding a loss as if it were either a certainty 
or impossibility," and thus, "the plaintiff will recover for a lost 
opportunity only if it appears more likely than not that but for the tort 
some definitive adverse result would have been avoided. "45 
Contrariwise, if the probability of the lost chance does not rise above 
50%, the plaintiff cannot meet her burden and recovers nothing under 
the traditional ali-or-nothing rule.46 Thus, even if a plaintiff can show 
definitively that a defendant has engaged in tortious conduct, which has 
caused a loss of a chance of avoiding harm or of receiving a future 
benefit, under the ali-or-nothing approach the plaintiff recovers no 
compensation. 47 To King and other commentators, this outcome appears 
overly harsh and unnecessary. 48 
39. See King, supra note 5, at 1353 (recognizing a tendency to commingle the 
concepts of causation and valuation); id. at 1363 ("What caused a loss ... should be a 
separate question from what the nature and extent of the loss are."). 
40. /d. at 1363. In other words, "[c]ausation questions relate to the fact of a 
loss or of its source." /d. at 1353-54. 
41. /d. at 1354. 
42. See id. at 1389. 
43. Fisher, supra note 8, at 605-06. 
44. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 26 cmt. n (citing 
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 178, at 435 & n.1 (2000)). 
45. King, supra note 5, at 1365. 
46. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 605-06. 
47. See King, supra note 5, at 1356 ("Unless a causal connection is established 
under the applicable standard of proof ... the plaintiff will receive nothing for the loss 
in question."). 
48. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477 (arguing that the traditional ali-or-nothing 
approach in medical malpractice context results in "a blanket release from liability for 
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Seeking to rectify this unsatisfactory legal state of affairs, King 
advanced the notion that courts should treat the chance at a favorable 
outcome as a compensable interest in its own right. 49 Specifically he 
suggested that, "the loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome 
or of avoiding an adverse consequence should be compensable and 
should be valued appropriately, rather than treated as an ali-or-nothing 
proposition. "50 Thus, even in cases where the opportunity at a favorable 
outcome was not better than even, the interest lost thereby should still be 
appropriately valued.51 Furthermore, he argued for an across-the-board 
application, referred to herein as "pure loss of chance theory. "52 Under 
pure loss of chance theory, even in cases where the opportunity at a 
favorable outcome is better than even, the loss of interest is not treated 
as a certainty, but valued based on the probability that the plaintiff 
would have received a benefit or avoided harm. 53 
doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival, 
regardless how flagrant the negligence"); King, supra note 5, at 1373. As King wrote: 
"The plaintiff who is able to demonstrate a probability of 50% or less that some future 
loss attributable to the tort will occur will be denied redress for that prospective loss. 
Yet it is manifest that the plaintiffs interests have been adversely affected." King, 
supra note 5, at 1373; see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 618 ("There is no theoretical 
basis for requiring that defendant completely destroy the chance in order to be subject to 
liability."). 
49. See King, supra note 5, at 1373; see also Todd S. Aagaard, Note, 
Identifying and Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1335, 1338-
39 (1998) (criticizing courts and commentators for failing to properly identify the precise 
tort injury in lost chance cases). In this manner, King sought to value the true interest 
lost when future expectancies were at stake. See King, supra note 5, at 1373; see also 
Fischer, supra note 9, at 605 ("[l]f a physician negligently fails to diagnose a curable 
disease, and the patient is harmed by the disease, the physician should be liable for 
causing the 'loss of a chance' of a cure."). 
50. King, supra note 5, at 1354; see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 617 ("A 
major rationale for loss of a chance where plaintiff cannot prove traditional damage is 
that the chance of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a harm has value in itself that is 
entitled to legal protection."). 
51. King, supra note 5, at 1354. Identifying the interest harmed as the "loss of 
a chance" in these cases may lead to another difficult issue: "whether persons deprived 
of an opportunity of avoiding harm who nevertheless do not suffer the harm may recover 
for the lost opportunity." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 26 cmt. n. 
As discussed below, however, commentators have made a distinction between lost 
chance theory where the harm has already occurred as opposed to increased risk theory, 
where the future harm is still speculative. See infra note 92. In any event, although this 
distinction is clearly important in the medical malpractice context, it is less likely to be 
so in the employment discrimination context in which lost chance will apply only if 
employer liability has been established for engaging in unlawful discrimination in the 
first instance. See infra Part II. A. 
52. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 358 (defining "pure loss of a chance 
theory"). 
53. King, supra note 5, at 1376. According to King: "Loss of a chance should 
be compensable even if the chance is not better than even, and it should be recognized 
and valued as such rather than an ali-or-nothing proposition. Any other rule fails to 
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B. The Cancer Misdiagnosis Hypothetical 
In order to more clearly explain how King's lost chance theory 
operates in practice, it is helpful to compare the manner in which many 
jurisdictions to this day still resolve these tort issues under the ali-or-
nothing approach, as compared to how the lost chance theory would 
apply in similar circumstances. The most common scenario 
contemplated for these purposes, and in fact derived from a scenario set 
out by King himself, occurs in the medical malpractice context. 54 
Under this scenario, a patient goes to the doctor on date X and 
receives a clean bill of health. Three months later on date Y, that same 
patient goes to the same doctor, is diagnosed with cancer, and is told 
that she has now only a 10% chance of surviving the cancer. If the 
patient had been properly diagnosed on date X, she would have had a 
40% chance of surviving the cancer. Unfortunately, the patient 
eventually dies from the cancer and her estate brings an action in state 
court. 55 
satisfy the goals of tort law." /d. For example, where the plaintiff could prove that, 
absent discrimination, he would have had a 95% chance of receiving the position in 
question, under pure loss of a chance theory he should receive 95% of the value of the 
job, not 100% as would be awarded under the traditional ali-or-nothing rule. See 
Truckor, supra note 17, at 367-68. 
54. King, supra note 5, at 1363-64. Although medical malpractice is the 
context in which most commentators have analyzed lost chance theory, others have 
recognized that this remedial approach can apply in various areas of tort law, including 
failures to rescue, to warn, to provide safety devices, and to give informed consent to 
medical procedures. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 606. But see Noah, supra note 2 
(manuscript at 10) ("Those jurisdictions that recognize claims for the loss of less-than-
even odds generally have not extended the theory beyond the medical malpractice 
context."). 
55. Assuming, as we do in the hypothetical above, that the patient dies as a 
result of the negligent misdiagnosis, a survivorship action rather than a wrongful death 
action should be brought under a lost chance theory because in a wrongful death action, 
beneficiaries sue in their own right, not as a representative of the deceased person's 
estate. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 372-73. Because the beneficiaries of the 
deceased have not themselves lost a chance of recovery as a result of the negligence, 
they would not appear to have a wrongful death action. See id. at 372; see also Edwards 
v. Family Practice Assoc., 798 A.2d 1059, 1063 (Del. 2002) (finding a survivorship 
claim to be a more appropriate cause of action than a wrongful death action in a loss of 
chance case). On the other hand, a wrongful death action would properly be brought 
under an ali-or-nothing approach under which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for the 
ultimate harm (that is, the death of the patient). See, e.g., Cooper v. Sisters of Charity 
of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971). 
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 757 2005
2005:747 A Public Interest Model 757 
Table A 
Hypothetical Loss of a Chance Medical Malpractice Scenario 
Visit to Doctor Diagnosis Chance of 
Surviving Cancer 
Date X Clean Bill of Health 40% chance 
Date Y Cancer Diagnosis 10% chance 
(3 months later) 
Under the traditional aU-or-nothing approach, the question posed 
would be whether the plaintiff could prove by the preponderance of the 
evidence that the doctor's negligence in misdiagnosing the patient's 
cancer more likely than not caused the patient's death. 56 In this analysis, 
the plaintiff seeks redress for the patient's premature death in terms of 
the value of that patient's life to others had she lived. 57 However, 
because the patient never had more than a 40% chance of surviving the 
cancer (even under the best case scenario of being properly diagnosed 
on date X), the plaintiff will not be able to meet her evidentiary burden 
of establishing that the doctor's negligent actions caused the patient's 
death. 58 Thus, under the aU-or-nothing approach, the plaintiff would 
receive no recovery, even though the doctor has clearly engaged in some 
negligence and harmed the patient in some real way by the 
misdiagnosis. 59 
Under the loss of a chance approach, the critical distinction is how 
the court identifies the interest that has been destroyed. 60 Whereas the 
interest thought to be harmed in the aU-or-nothing approach is the life of 
56. Put slightly differently, the question would be whether the doctor's 
negligence was a "but for" cause of the plaintiffs injury. See King, supra note 5, at 
1355, 1367 ("[Tlhe ali-or-nothing ... rule denies compensation for the loss of a not-
better-than-even chance of avoiding some adverse result."). 
51. See id. "Damages in personal injury tort actions are traditionally awarded 
in a single lump sum that is intended fully to compensate the plaintiff for all past and 
future consequences of the tort." /d. at 1370. Consequently, in valuing the life of the 
deceased patient, a court will have to consider such factors as life expectancy (based on 
such factors as age and health), loss of future earnings, and injury caused to others by 
the loss of that person's companionship (that is, consortium). See id. at 1382. 
Moreover, the prospect of such future losses must be proven with "reasonable 
certainty." /d. at 1371. "Reasonable certainty," in turn, is defined as lying 
"somewhere between speculation and actual certainty." /d. 
58. To reiterate, this is because preponderance of the evidence (more than 50% 
likelihood) is the standard of proof in most civil actions. See Wax, supra note 5, at 
1212. 
59. See King, supra note 5, at 1373. This characterization assumes, of course, 
that the patient actually died. For a discussion on the difference between lost chance 
claims and increased risk claims depending upon whether the patient has died as a result 
of the negligent misdiagnosis, see infra note 88. 
60. See King, supra note 5, at 1370. 
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the patient (that is, the ultimate harm), lost chance theory focuses 
instead on the loss of opportunity of survival by the patient (that is, an 
intermediate harm). 61 Under lost chance theory, therefore, the causation 
inquiry devolves into a more easily satisfied inquiry: whether the 
plaintiff can establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the 
doctor's negligent malpractice caused the destruction of a certain degree 
of chance that the patient had at survival. 62 In most cases of this type, 
the answer to this refined causation question will be "yes." 
What remains, then, is the valuation inquiry; that is, once one 
re,:ognizes that the loss of a chance is a cognizable interest for which 
redress may be sought, one must decide how to go about valuing that 
interest. 63 Initially, in valuing the extent of the loss, the pre injury 
condition or preexisting condition of the victim should be taken into 
account. 64 To do this, the court simply takes the difference between the 
chance of survival prenegligence and the chance of survival 
postnegligence and then multiplies this figure by the value of the 
individual's life had she lived.65 To be more concrete, if the patient's 
life was valued at $100,000 and the loss of opportunity is quantified as 
30% (40% prenegligence chance minus 10% postnegligence chance), 
61. See id. 
62. /d. at 1394 ("[W]hile the loss of a not-better-than-even chance of avoiding 
some adverse result should be a compensable loss, it still must be established that the 
defendant caused the destruction of that chance."). In other words, "the all-or-nothing 
idea may continue to be applied to causation even if it is abandoned for the purposes of 
valuation." /d. at 1395; see also Truckor, supra note 17, at 358. This crucial point 
appears to be the most difficult distinction to grasp for opponents of the lost chance 
approach. See, e.g., Weigand, supra note 9, at 301 ("The effect of the [theory of 
recovery] is that it alters the traditional 'more likely than not' burden of proof."); see 
also Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995) ("We are persuaded that the 
'the loss of chance doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the requisite degree of medical 
certitude necessary to establish a causal link between the injury of a patient and the 
tonious conduct of a physician.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 
S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993)). 
63. See King, supra note 5, at 1381. 
64. /d. at 1356, 1385. In this scenario, the preexisting condition could be 
defined as "a disease, condition, or force that has become sufficiently associated with the 
victim to be factored into the value of the interest destroyed, and that has become so 
before the defendant's conduct has reached a similar stage." /d. at 1357 (citing 
WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §52, at 321-22 (4th ed. 1971)). 
65. This approach is based on the "conjunction principle." See King, supra 
note 5, at 1382, 1389 ("A better method of valuation would measure a compensable 
chance as the percentage probability by which the defendant's tortious conduct 
diminished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome."). The reason 
why the calculation works in this manner is because "'mathematical probability obeys a 
multiplicative conjunction principle, whereby the probability that two independent events 
both occur is equal to the mathematical product of their individual probabilities.'" /d. at 
1388 (quoting L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 51-52 (1977)); see also 
id. at 1389 ("The conjunction principle should be an indispensable feature of the 
valuation process."). 
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then the plaintiff should be able to recover $30,000 under these 
circumstances. This number more closely represents the harm caused 
by the doctor's misdiagnosis.66 
The advantage of this outcome in not-better-than-even-chance cases 
is that the plaintiff will not be overcompensated unnecessarily for the 
value of her remaining life when the cancer in all probability would 
have killed her anyway. 67 At the same time, the patient is not 
undercompensated, although the doctor's actions may not have literally 
caused her death, because the doctor's action did make the patient's 
death more likely, and the chance of avoiding that adverse consequence 
should be quantified in some manner. 68 Concerns of fairness also 
counsel for an approach that provides some recovery for the patient's 
lost chance of survival because it is the doctor's negligence after all that 
has made it impossible to determine with any certainty what would have 
66. Some commentators have described a different type of valuation analysis 
based on the "increase of relative risk" or "attributable risk" for lost chance cases in the 
medical malpractice context. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 253-54 (1999) 
(describing the increase of the relative risk model); Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 
28 n.88) (concluding that the attributable risk calculation provides clarity by converting 
loss-of-a-chance claims into evaluations of relative risk); see also Aaron D. Twerski & 
Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in lnfonned Consent: Comparing Physicians to 
Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 28 n.68 ( 1999) (applying the relative risk model to 
informed consent claims). Under these approaches, the fact finder seeks to determine 
the likelihood that the doctor's negligence caused the patient's ultimate injury. See 
Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 27) (noting that an attributable risk of 53% establishes 
that "the defendant's negligence probably caused the ultimate injury"). But, as the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico has rightly pointed out: 
[U]nder the lost-chance theory, the patient does not allege that the 
malpractice caused his or her entire injury. Rather, the claim is that the 
health care provider's negligence reduced the chance of avoiding the injury 
actually sustained. Thus, it is that chance in and of itself-the lost 
opportunity of avoiding the presenting problem and achieving a better 
result-that becomes the item of value for which the patient seeks 
compensation. 
Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1283 (N.M. 1999) (citations omitted). In short, both 
the relative risk and attributable risk methods focus on the ultimate injury rather than the 
lost opportunity, and therefore, represent just another method of proving traditional tort 
causation. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 32, 36) (recognizing this criticism to 
his approach, but suggesting that the attributable risk approach will limit the cases in 
which loss of chance analysis has to be utilized in the first place). In this sense, these 
types of analyses are not properly categorized as loss of chance approaches to tort 
recovery. 
!d. 
67. See King, supra note 5, at 1387. 
68. See id. at 1377. As King wrote: 
The ali-or-nothing approach to loss of a chance ... subverts the deterrence 
objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of conduct that 
causes statistically demonstrable losses. By placing such losses outside tort 
law, the ali-or-nothing approach distorts the loss-assigning role of that law. 
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happened absent the negligence. 69 All in all, King asserted that his 
approach of valuing the interest harmed by the defendant's conduct best 
supported the loss allocation and deterrence goals of tort law. 70 
C. Criticisms Surrounding the Lost Chance Approach 
Although lost chance theory can claim the advantages discussed in 
the preceding Section, criticisms of this approach abound and only 
fourteen states (at the time of the writing of this Article) have clearly 
adopted a lost chance theory in the medical malpractice context. 71 The 
criticisms of the lost chance approach can be categorized into two main 
groups: (1) the inevitable problems surrounding the valuation of a loss 
of a chance and subsequent jury confusion on the remedial issues to be 
decided; 72 and (2) the lack of a principled basis for limiting application 
of loss of a chance to a certain range of cases. 73 
First, with regard to the concern that valuing these losses of chance 
is incredibly complex, it might be true to an extent that to put a value on 
such opportunities may be little more than an elaborate, arbitrary 
guessing game. 74 Moreover, as confusing as civil litigation is today for 
69. See id. at 1378. 
70. See id. at 1381 (arguing that the ali-or-nothing approach "undermines the 
loss-assigning function of tort law by improperly externalizing significant costs of 
various enterprises"). 
71. These fourteen states are: Arizona (Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 
Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984)); Indiana (Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 
539-41 (Ind. 2000)); Iowa (Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 331-32 (Iowa 
1998)); Kansas (Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 184-87 (Kan. 1994)); Louisiana 
(Gordon v. Willis Knighton Med. Ctr., 661 So. 2d 991, 999-1001 (La. Ct. App. 
1995)); Missouri (Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 683-86 (Mo. 1992)); 
Nevada (Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 591-93 (Nev. 1991)); New 
Hampshire (Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 1106 (N.H. 2001)); New Jersey (Scafadi v. 
Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 405-06 (N.J. 1990)); New Mexico (Albens, 975 P.2d at 1282-
83); Ohio (Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 
(Ohio 1996)); Oklahoma (McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 474-77 
(Okla. 1987)); Washington (Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477); and Wyoming (McMackin v. 
Johnson City Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094, 1100 (Wyo. 2003)). Although Michigan 
(Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990)), and South Dakota (Jorgensen 
v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370-71 (S.D. 2000)) initially adopted lost chance theory 
judicially, the theory has now been legislatively abrogated in these states in the medical 
malpractice context. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2912a(b)(2) (2000); S.D. 
CODE ANN. § 20-9-1 (Lexis Supp. 2002). 
72. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3) (suggesting that lost chance 
theory mathematical calculations may pose too great of a challenge for both litigants and 
decision-makers). 
73. Moore, supra note 13, at 214. 
74. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 621 (maintaining that the application of lost 
chance theory may lead to "widely speculative damages" as a result of little evidence 
concerning the magnitude of the loss of chance); Wax, supra note 5, at 1224 ("A 
probabilistic rule that requires assigning a precise probability to the elements ... that 
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the average juror, the last thing we need, the argument goes, is a further 
complication of the issues in dispute. 75 Be that as it may, these types of 
conjectures also occur both in normal causation analysis76 and in the 
comparative negligence setting, 77 and yet juries are commonly asked to 
rely on their innate sense of fairness and common sense. 78 ln any event, 
using probability analysis to engage in transparene9 loss valuations is 
still preferable to maintaining the use of the aU-or-nothing approach with 
its harsh, arbitrary, and unfair results. 80 
contribute to any workplace decision would strain the fact-finding capability of a liability 
system to the breaking point."); cf Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision 
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1377 (1971) (arguing that "the 
costs of attempting to integrate mathematics into the factfinding process of a legal trial 
outweigh the benefits"). 
75. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 364 (observing that lost chance theory is 
confusing to juries and statistics can be easily manipulated by experts); see also Fennell 
v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213-14 (Md. 1990) (refusing to adopt lost 
chance theory because of concern about misuse of "unreliable, misleading, easily 
manipulated, and confusing" statistical information). Nevertheless, as discussed below, 
the difficulty of calculating probabilities may be somewhat assuaged in the employment 
discrimination eontext where judges will be primarily responsible for calculating lost 
chance values. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
76. See Jorgensen, 616 N.W.2d at 371 (maintaining that the fact that lost 
chance doctrine relies on statistical evidence "in order to assign a value to the lost 
chance" does not make the theory more speculative because "such use of mathematical 
calculations is already necessary under traditional standards of causation" to show that 
the plaintiff once enjoyed a greater than even chance of surviving), abrogated by 
legislative amendment, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1. 
77. Some may argue that comparing lost chance analysis to comparative 
negligence analysis is inapt because lost chance deals with probabilities about some 
occurrence in the real world, while comparative fault involves a normative assessment 
and, therefore, has no objective measure (the author would like to thank Professor 
Michael D. Green for sharing his views on this particular topic). Although I agree with 
Green's view of the two concepts, nevertheless, both analyses are similar in requiring 
apportionments that would appear to permit a plaintiff to recover without proving that 
the defendant's negligence more probably than not caused her injury. See Noah, supra 
note 2 (manuscript at 25) ("[N]ow that many courts fully apportion damages among 
litigants according to their share of responsibility for an injury, the loss-of-a-chance 
theory as an issue of valuation rather than causation no longer looks so terribly 
radical."). 
78. See Truckor, supra note 17 at 366 ("Juries are typically permitted to rely 
on their own intuition and experience in calculating damages in negligence 
cases .... "). 
79. By transparency, I mean the basic proposition that things go better when 
processes are open. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Transparency, LEGAL 
THEORY BLOG (Dec. 21, 2003), at http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/ 
2003 12 01 Isolum archive.html#107201605073347259. 
-so:- -Fischef. supra note 9, at 640 ("It is better that plaintiff recover something 
on the basis of the best estimate possible, even if it is based on averages, than that she 
recover nothing."); King, supra note 5, at 1385, 1387 ("[l]n spite of its unavoidable 
inexactness, the compensation of lost chances will introduce a substantial higher level of 
precision and, therefore, validity into the loss-assigning process."); see also Aagaard, 
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Second, some commentators and jurists have argued that in order 
for lost chance theory to be viable, it is necessary to develop limiting 
principles that restrict its application. Such limitation is necessary, it is 
argued, so that lost chance theory does not lead to a mad rush to the 
courthouse and to an even more foreboding form of liability for 
employers, which may lead to unintended consequences, including more 
restrictive hiring and promotion practices.81 Although these concerns 
certainly have resonance, lost chance theory can be properly limited by 
applying a de minimis threshold. For instance, one possible limiting 
standard would be to restrict loss of chance recoveries to plaintiffs who 
had at least a 10% chance of receiving a job prior to the employer's 
discriminatory conduct. 82 Such an approach would certainly address 
concerns regarding "flooding the courts with speculative cases. "83 In 
any event, the issue concerning whether there should be a de minimis 
exception to lost chance theory is separate from whether lost chance 
theory should be utilized at all. 84 As Judge Posner wrote in Doll v. 
Brown in 1996: 
supra note 49, at 1336; Truckor, supra note 17, at 361. 
81. See Moore, supra note 13, at 214 (observing that some courts have limited 
the lost chance approach to cases of serious injury or death, or also requiring that the 
loss of a chance be substantial or significimt); see also Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("To avoid 
flooding the courts with speculative cases, the lost chance to be actionable should no 
doubt exceed a de minimis threshold.") (citations omitted). 
82. There is nothing magical about the 10% threshold selected, although this 
number has heen found to be "substantial" as a matter of law by at least one court. See 
Pipe v. Hamilton, 56 P.3d 823, 829 (Kan. 2002). As the Supreme Court of Kansas 
stated in Pipe: "Pipe contends a 10 percent chance of survival is more than a trifling 
matter and is something that Kansas public policy supports as being recognized as 
substantial. We agree. As a matter of law, a 10 percent loss of chance cannot be said to 
be token or de minimis." /d.; see also Moore, supra note 13, at 214, 215 n.lOl (noting 
that some courts have sought to limit the lost chance theory by requiring that the 
percentage lost be substantial or significant and recommending that courts specify a 
range of percentages that qualify as substantial). But see Perez, 805 P.2d at 592 
(observing that a 10% loss of chance would probably not qualify as a substantial loss of 
chance under the doctrine). 
83. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206. It may be said here that it is unlikely that such a 
mad rush to the courthouse would be caused by a pure loss of chance theory as the 
smallness of potential awards would not give individual plaintiffs enough incentive to 
pursue such awards. On the other hand, if a class action attorney brings a big enough 
class made up of plaintiffs each having less than a 1 % chance of recovery, the incentive 
may be there for the lawyer to bring the claim if he can convince enough potential 
plaintiffs, and in particular a good lead plaintiff, to pursue the action. This latter 
scenario actually suggests that there should be a de minimis level of chance that must be 
exceeded before a case is considered appropriate for the lost chance approach. 
84. See, e.g., Delaney, 873 P.2d at 185-86 (recognizing a lost chance theory 
of recovery, while at the same time disapproving of lost chance recovery for "token or 
de minimis" losses of chance). 
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To avoid flooding the courts with speculative cases, the lost 
chance to be actionable should no doubt exceed a de minimis 
threshold .... But that is a detail which, important as it is for 
keeping the concept of the lost chance within reasonable 
bounds, does not qualify the essential soundness of the 
method.85 
D. The Herskovits Case: A Medical Malpractice Application 
of the Lost Chance Theory 
763 
The Supreme Court of Washington adopted the loss of a chance 
remedial approach in 1983 in the seminal case of Herskovits. 86 In that 
case, the court was called on to decide whether an estate could maintain 
an action for professional negligence based on the failure to timely 
diagnose the decedent's lung cancer. 87 As in the hypothetical example 
presented above, the estate could show that the defendants' negligence 
caused a decrease in the likelihood of the decedent surviving the cancer, 
but could not establish "but for" liability. 88 Specifically, the 
misdiagnosis of the decedent's lung cancer caused a 14% percent 
reduction (from 39% to 25%) in the chance of survival.89 
In an interesting division of opinions, the supreme court, sitting en 
bane, ruled in favor of the plaintiff six to three. 90 The lead opinion, in 
which only two justices joined, found that "medical testimony of a 
reduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is 
sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the 
jury. "91 Thus, these two judges, following the so-called "increased 
85. 75 F. 3d at 1206 (citations omitted). 
86. 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
87. I d. (Pearson, J., concurring). 
88. ld. (Pearson, J., concurring). 
89. See id. at 475 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
90. See id. at 479, 487 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
91. /d. at 479 (Pearson, J ., concurring). It appears that the lead opinion is 
actually talking about cause-in-fact or factual cause (that is, "but for" cause), rather than 
proximate cause (that is, reasonable foreseeability). See Joseph H. King, Jr., 
"Reduction of Likelihood" Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of Loss-of-a-Chance 
Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 491, 498-99 (1998). Of course, Herskovits is not alone 
in falling into this confusion. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 
9, § 26 cmt. a ("Both because it is not well-entrenched and because of the importance of 
distinguishing clearly between 'factual cause' and 'proximate cause,' this Restatement 
employs different terminology to address these two requirements for liability in tort."); 
Bert Black, A New Metaphor for Clarifying the Difference Between Cause-in-Fact and 
Proximate Cause, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 159 (2000) (discussing new methods for 
overcoming the general confusion between the tort concepts of cause-in-fact and 
proximate cause); see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
1735, 1764 n.l21 (1985) (maintaining that "confusion [between cause-in-fact and 
proximate cause] now pervades the fifth edition of Prosser's hornbook"). 
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risk" approach,92 improperly conflated the causation and valuation 
inquiry as King predicted many courts would continue to do. 93 
Rather than defining the injury as a loss of a chance at survival, 
which the defendant clearly caused, 94 the lead decision improperly 
defined the interest harmed in terms of the actual loss of decedent's 
life,95 making it nearly impossible to establish that the defendants caused 
the decedent's harm.96 Nevertheless, the lead decision used the 
"increased risk" doctrine to resurrect the plaintiff's case. 97 Stating that 
it is not for the "wrongdoer, who put the possibility of recovery beyond 
realization, to say afterward that the result was inevitable, "98 the lead 
opinion permits the issue of causation to go to the jury to determine 
whether the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a "significant" 
chance of recovery, and thereby allows the jury to make the step from 
increased risk to causation. 99 Consequently, the lead decision in 
Herskovits speaks in the language of causation and does not even 
mention the separate concept of valuation or King's lost chance 
theory. 100 
92. Under the "increased risk" approach under section 323 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, courts focus on defendants who have negligently rendered aid and 
consequently have increased the risk of harm to those they are trying to assist. See 
Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476; see also Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 9) ("Some 
courts even apply the [loss of a chance] theory in cases where the ultimate injury has not 
yet-and may never-become manifest, which amounts to a claim for enhanced future 
risk.") (citing Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1173 (1999)). Nevertheless, many look at increased risk cases 
with more skepticism in general than lost chance cases, arguing that a plaintiff should 
only bring such a case once the future harm actually materializes. See Aagaard, supra 
note 49, at 1343-44. Additionally, the comments to the new section 26 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Hann, state that reliance on section 
323 is misplaced in the lost chance context because "[section 323]'s placement in Topic 
7, entitled 'Duties of Affirmative Action,' reveals that it addresses the question of the 
existence of a duty and its scope for a person who undertakes to protect another from 
harm." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 26 cmt. n. 
93. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
94. The parties stipulated for purposes of appeal that defendants "failed to 
diagnose [the decedent's] cancer on his first visit to the hospital and proximately caused 
[a] 14 percent reduction in his chances of survival." Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 475. 
95. "The ultimate question raised here is whether the relationship between the 
increased risk of hann and [the decedent's] death is sufficient to hold [defendant] 
responsible." /d. at 476 (emphasis added). 
96. The parties had also stipulated that the decedent had less than a 50% 
chance of survival at all times. Id. at 475. 
97. The approach of the majority is consistent with one of King's criticisms of 
the traditional ali-or-nothing approach: it "creates pressure to manipulate and distort 
other rules affecting causation and damages in an attempt to mitigate perceived 
injustices." /d. at 487 (Pearson, 1., concurring) (citing King, supra note 5, at 1377). 
98. /d. at 476 (citations omitted). 
99. /d. at476,478. 
100. The lead opinion does use the terminology "loss of a chance." /d. at 478. 
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On the other hand, the concurring opinion, written by Justice 
Vernon Pearson, and joined by three other justices, represents the first 
expressed endorsement of King's lost chance theory .101 First, the 
opinion, consistent with lost chance theory, defines the injury caused by 
the defendant as "the reduction of [the decedent's] chance of surviving 
the cancer from which he suffered. "102 Second, having defined the 
injury differently, the concurring opinion also recognizes that "[w]hat 
caused a loss ... should be a separate question from what the nature 
and extent of the loss are. "103 Third, the concurrence concludes by 
stating that it "would hold that plaintiff has established a prima facie 
issue of proximate cause by producing testimony that defendant probably 
caused substantial reduction in [decedent's] chance of survival. " 104 
Finally, and albeit in a footnote, the concurring opinion finds the 
statistics, showing a loss of a 14% chance of survival by the defendant's 
action, most appropriate for determining the amount of damages, rather 
than as a method of establishing causation. 105 
Interestingly, the Herskovits concurrence appears to adopt a 
modified lost chance theory. In reviewing cases cited by the plaintiff, 
Justice Pearson notes that three of the cases involve instances in which 
the chance of survival was greater than 50%, and that in such cases the 
injury is properly recognized as the death of the decedent. 106 That being 
said, the concurring opinion is not clear as to why it rejects King's 
"pure" version of lost chance theory, which would have instead required 
However, it seems to be improperly conflating the increased risk doctrine with lost 
chance theory. See id. (Pearson, J., concurring). Whereas increased risk doctrine is 
still based on a causation inquiry and permits the jury to make "[t]he step from the 
increased risk to causation," id. , (Pearson, J., concurring) lost chance theory focuses on 
redefining the interest harmed and then valuing that interest. See Aagaard, supra note 
49, at 1344 ("Unlike the increased-risk claim, which seeks compensation for the 
possibility that an as-yet unmanifested injury will occur in the future, the harm in a lost 
chance case already has materialized."). 
101. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring) (explicitly stating 
that this conclusion to adopt lost chance theory was based on the "thoughtful discussion" 
of King). 
102. See id. at 481 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
103. /d. at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring) (quoting King, supra note 5, at 1363). 
104. /d. at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring). Again, the concurrence confuses 
causation-in-fact with proximate cause. See supra note 92. 
105. /d. at 475; id. at 487 n.2 (Pearson, J., concurring). As far as determining 
the amount of damages, Justice Vernon Pearson does no more than cite King's 
hypothetical lost chance calculation for guidance. See id. at 487 (Pearson, J., 
concurring) (citing King, supra note 5, at 1382). It is also interesting to note that 
permitting a 14% reduction in chance is consistent with setting the de minimis threshold 
at 10% as discussed above. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
106. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 485 (Pearson, J ., concurring). 
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lost chance theory principles to be applied across the board even to 
better-than-even-chance cases. 107 
In any event, after Herskovits, a number of courts adopted the lost 
chance theory in the medical malpractice context. 108 Moreover, the lost 
chance theory has found some resonance among scholarly commentators 
and courts in such areas as wrongful life jurisprudence. 109 That being 
said, almost all courts that have adopted lost chance analysis in the 
medical malpractice context have generally refused to extend it outside 
of those confines. 110 Recently, however, the Seventh Circuit has sought 
to break that trend by introducing lost chance theory into the 
employment discrimination context. 
II. THE INTRODUCTION OF "PURE" LOST CHANCE THEORY INTO 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 
It would be another thirteen years after the Herskovits decision until 
lost chance theory would be applied to probabilistic injuries in the 
employment discrimination context. 111 Judge Posner first suggested this 
approach in the case of Doll. 112 
107. See id. (Pearson, J., concurring). 
108. See supra note 71. 
109. See Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348-50 (Nev. 1995) (utilizing 
the lost chance method to find for the plaintiff in a wrongful life case); Deana A. 
Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. REv. 327, 356-
58 (2004) (utilizing the lost chance doctrine in a wrongful life context to argue that a 
baby's Joss of a chance at a healthier life constitutes a compensable injury). 
110. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 10) (providing a Jist of the cases in 
which courts applied the lost chance theory to medical malpractice contexts); see also 
John C.P. Goldberg, What Clients Are Owed: Cautionary Observations on Lawyers and 
Loss of a Chance, 52 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1208-13 (2003) (arguing against expanding the 
lost chance theory into the legal malpractice context). 
111. But see Paul Speaker, The Application of the Loss of Chance Doctrine in 
Class Actions, 21 REv. LlTlG. 345, 354 (2002) (claiming that the lost chance doctrine 
had been previously applied to employment discrimination cases, but not referred to in 
those courts as "loss of a chance") (citing Hameed v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & 
Ornamental Iron Workers, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980)). Yet, Hameed seems to be 
Jess about lost chance theory, and more about another theory of damage apportionment 
based on pro rata shares in the class action environment. See Hameed, 637 F.2d at 519-
21. In this regard, Hameed is a class-wide remedy case utilizing a one-size-fits-all 
"mathematical blender," see Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.N.J. 
1979), rather than a case seeking to provide individual loss of chance determinations as 
the Seventh Circuit attempts to do in the three cases that follow. See infra Parts II.A-C. 
112. 75 F.3d 1200. 
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A. Doll v. Brown: A "Theoretical Discussion"113 on Pure Lost Chance 
Theory in the Employment Discrimination Context 
Charles Doll, a fifty-something electrician at a Veterans 
Administration hospital in Illinois, sued the U.S. government for 
disability discrimination and for failing to accommodate his disability 
under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 114 Specifically, 
Doll believed that because of a laryngectomy and tracheotomy stemming 
from throat cancer, he was forced to undertake a less desirable job (a 
parts and tool attendant) while he recovered, and was thereafter both 
refused reinstatement to his original electrician position and was not 
considered for a promotion to the electrical foreman position. 115 
After the federal district court found in Doll's favor at the 
conclusion of a bench trial, 116 it reinstated him to his original, 
presickness electrician position. 117 On the issue of whether he would 
have been further promoted to the electrical foreman position in the 
absence of discrimination, the district court sought to cobble together a 
remedial resolution based on the fact that it was unclear whether Doll 
would have actually received the foreman position. 118 In this regard, the 
court awarded Doll over $61,000 in back pay, 119 and issued declaratory 
relief requiring that the Veterans hospital consider Doll for the 
electrician foreman position next time it became vacant. 120 
On appeal, Judge Posner, writing for a three judge panel of the 
Seventh Circuit, 121 came to a rather unexceptional conclusion in vacating 
and remanding the district court's remedy. Finding that the case was a 
so-called "no-injury case," 122 the court focused on the nature of the 
113. Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1016. 
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 791; see also Doll, 15 F.3d at 1201. 
115. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1201-02. 
116. Liability was found against the government on the basis of both disability 
discrimination and failure to accommodate the known physical disability of Charles 
Doll, a qualified applicant. /d. at 1203. 
117. /d. at 1202. 
118. /d. at 1205 (outlining Doll's counsel's argument that the district judge 
"splitD the difference" in arriving at a remedy for Doll). 
119. The back pay award "represent[edl the difference between the salary he 
actually received between April 1988 (when the foreman's job went to [the other 
applicant]) and the date of trial and the salary he would have received had he been made 
foreman then." /d. at 1202. 
120. /d. As it turns out, the job became vacant during the litigation, but Doll 
was again passed over for the promotion. See id. 
121. /d. at 1201. Judges Frank Easterbrook and John Cummings joined Judge 
Posner's decision for the court. /d. 
122. In a "no-injury case," the plaintiff has proven liability and the defendant 
seeks to escape the imposition of damages by establishing by some burden of persuasion 
that tbe plaintiff was made no worse off by the discrimination. See id. at 1202 (citing 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 362; Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73). In contradistinction, 
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burden that the defendant must meet in order to escape having to pay 
damages or any other forms of relief. 123 Although Judge Posner was 
uncomfortable requiring defendants in no-injury cases to meet the clear 
and convincing burden of persuasion, the government defendant failed to 
properly brief the issue, and he, therefore, could make no ruling on this 
issue. 124 
On the other major point of contention involving the proper remedy 
for failing to promote Doll to the electrical foreman position, Judge 
cases outside of the Title VII context may still fall under the Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins framework, meaning that the employer may still avoid liability by establishing 
that it would have taken the same decision even in the absence of discrimination. See 
Doll, 15 F.3d at 1202-03 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 
(1989)). Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the 1991 Act"), and its 
codification of mixed-motive analysis for Title VII cases, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B), there is an argument that other types of discrimination cases (including 
disability cases under the Rehabilitation Act) should also be subject to the 1991 Act's 
analysis under which meeting this "same decision" test only goes to decreasing the types 
of damages available to a plaintiff, rather than relieving the plaintiff of all liability. See 
Doll, 15 F.3d at 1203 (assuming without deciding that Price Waterhouse still applies to 
some mixed-motive discrimination cases); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 
(setting out the 1991 Act's approach to damages in Title VII mixed-motive cases); Miles 
F. Archer, Note, Mullin v. Raytheon Co.: The Threatened Vitality of Disparate Impact 
Under the ADEA, 52 ME. L. REv. 149, 156 n.56 (2000) (observing that it is still unclear 
whether the mixed-motive provisions of the 1991 Act apply outside of the Title VII 
context); Laura C. Marino, Note, A Necessary Tool: The Continuing Debate over the 
Viability of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
77 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 649, 654-55 n.33 (2003) (same). A more thorough discussion of 
the available remedies in non-Title VII, employment discrimination mixed-motive cases 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
123. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1202. One of the significant ways in which 
constitutional and statutory torts in the employment discrimination context differ from 
the garden-variety medical malpractice or products liability tort is the availability of 
affirmative defenses to the defendant once the plaintiff carries her burden by proving 
that defendant has engaged in unlawful employment discrimination. See id. (citing 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 362; and Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73). Even if the 
plaintiff proves the employer has violated the law, the case does not end there. Instead, 
the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that its actions made the 
employee no worse off; that is, the employer's actions caused the employee no iqjury. 
See id. In such a case, the defendant is not disclaiming liability, but seeking to reduce 
damages to a nominal level by arguing in essence that even though unlawful 
discrimination occurred, it did not cause any iqjury to the plaintiff. See id. 
To those familiar with employment discrimination law, this shifting of the burden 
of persuasion is similar to what occurs with the "same decision" test in mixed-motive 
analysis, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), or what occurs with the shifting of the 
burden of persuasion in the damages phase of Teamsters pattern and practice litigation. 
See 431 U.S. at 359 ("By 'demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern 
and practice' the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of discrimination against the 
individual class members; the burden therefore shifted to the employer 'to prove that 
individuals who reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination."') 
(quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 772). 
124. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1203-04, 1207. 
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Posner was confused why the district court judge awarded full back pay 
to Doll, but nevertheless only ordered that he be considered for a 
promotion the next time the electrician foreman position became 
available. 125 Instead, he thought that the district court should have either 
followed the traditional ali-or-nothing approach and deny all relief to 
Doll, or it should have granted full relief, including full back pay along 
with either: (1) instatement into the electrical foreman position, or 
failing that, (2) front pay relief to place him in approximately the same 
position he would have been absent the discrimination. 126 Because the 
district judge did not take either approach, Judge Posner vacated the 
back pay award and remanded the case back to the district court to 
determine the appropriate remedy for Doll. 127 
Nevertheless, because the district judge appeared to be torn 
between the fact that Doll was unlawfully discriminated against by the 
government in applying for the promotion to the foreman position, and 
the fact that the evidence suggested that Doll would probably not have 
received the foreman position even in the absence of discrimination, 
Judge Posner could not resist making another suggestion as to how the 
district judge could appropriately "split the difference" in fashioning a 
remedy for Doll. 128 Although not required to do so in order to reach the 
holding in the case, 129 Judge Posner suggested that the district court 
implement lost chance theory by applying the clear and convincing 
evidence rule governing the defendant's no-injury defense to 
"probabilities as distinct from certainties of loss. "130 
The lost chance theory's focus on probabilities seemed to 
correspond perfectly with this type of employment discrimination case, 
where "proof of injury is inescapably uncertain. "131 After explaining the 
125. See id. at 1205. 
126. See id. ("[R]ather than just ordering the hospital to consider Doll for 
appointment to foreman the next time a vacancy arose, [he} should either have ordered 
him appointed to the position forthwith ... or awarded him front pay .... The relief 
he ordered fell short."). 
127. See id. at 1207. 
128. ld. 
129. Indeed, the lost chance theory had been briefed by neither party, as Judge 
Posner candidly admits. See id. at 1206 (observing that, not only did the parties not 
raise the lost chance theory in this case, but neither had anyone else to his knowledge). 
130. ld. at 1207. 
131. ld. at 1205-06. As Judge Posner wrote: "[I]t strikes us as peculiarly 
appropriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion [to apply the lost 
chance theory]. ln such a case the plaintiffs chances are inherently uncertain because of 
the competitive setting." !d. at 1206; see also King, supra note 91, at 495-96 
(recognizing the lost chance doctrine's appropriateness in scenarios in which "it is 
proven that the defendant's active, tortious conduct probably caused the victim's 
materialized injury and the only question is to what extent to reduce damages for that 
injury to reflect the likelihood that the victim's preexisting condition would produce 
harm independent of the tortious conduct"). 
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theory's origins in medical. malpractice cases, 132 Judge Posner expressed 
his opinion that the theory was "basically sound" and was merely "an 
extension of the routine practice in tort cases involving disabling injuries 
of discounting lost future earnings by the probability that the plaintiff 
would have been alive and working in each of the years for which 
damages are sought. "133 Relying upon King's seminal article, Judge 
Posner argued in Doll that what should be compensated in cases 
involving "the inescapably probabilistic character of many injuries" is 
not the loss of the job itself, but rather the loss of the opponunity to 
receive the job because of the employer's unlawful discriminatory 
conduct. 134 Compensating plaintiffs on the loss of a chance to obtain a 
job was necessary in order to avoid undercompensation and 
underdeterrence, on one hand, or overcompensation and overdeterrence, 
on the other .135 And, even though Judge Posner recognized the 
somewhat arbitrary nature of saying that someone lost a 25% chance of 
obtaining a job, 136 he nevertheless argued that such calculations would 
be no different from the calculations juries make all the time when they 
apportion fault under a comparative negligence statute. 137 
In the end, Judge Posner argued that doing these probability 
calculations front and center in order to split the difference in 
employment discrimination cases involving inherently uncertain injuries 
was far preferable to district court judges splitting the difference as they 
saw fit, perhaps based on nothing more than their own gut feelings. 138 
Nevertheless, recognizing that the application of lost chance theory to 
employment discrimination was an issue of first impression and had not 
132. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1205-06. 
133. /d. at 1206. Put differently, Judge Posner's approach represents another 
application of the conjunction principle. See supra note 65. 
134. See 15 F.3d at 1206 (emphasis added). 
135. /d. To illustrate his point concerning the inefficient and unjust effects of an 
ali-or-nothing approach in these types of employment discrimination cases, Judge Posner 
offered the following hypothetical in Doll: 
/d. 
Suppose there were five applicants for one job, the employer discriminated 
against four, and all four were equally well qualified, and the fifth got the 
job. Would all four of the discriminated-against applicants be entitled to 
back pay, one to the job, and the other three to front pay? Obviously not; 
yet without the lost-chance concept, which could grant reinstatement to none 
of the four and 25 percent front pay to each of them, the employer would get 
off scot-free. 
136. !d. at 1206-07. 
137. /d. at 1207. For a discussion of the criticisms surrounding the comparative 
negligence analogy, see supra note 77. 
138. See Doll, 15 F. 3d at 1206; see also supra note 79 (discussing the benefits 
of a transparent judicial decision-making process). 
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yet been briefed, Judge Posner merely commended this theory in Doll to 
the bench and bar for further consideration. 139 
B. Bishop v. Gainer: Cutting an Employment Discrimination Remedial 
"Gordian Knot "140 
It was not until about two years later that a district court judge took 
Judge Posner up on his invitation to apply the lost chance theory to an 
employment discrimination dispute. 141 And, it was not until another 
three years later in 2001 that the Seventh Circuit sanctioned on appeal 
the district court's application of the lost chance theory for probabilistic 
injuries in the employment discrimination context. 142 
In Bishop, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the district court 
judge erred in applying the lost chance remedial theory to determine 
monetary damages awards for three prevailing plaintiffs who did not 
receive retroactive promotions in a reverse race discrimination case. 143 
139. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1207. 
140. This terminology was utilized by Judge Terence T. Evans in Bishop v. 
Gainer to describe the actions of the district judge, Judge Harry Leinenweber, in 
adopting a lost chance approach to a probabilistic injury scenario in the employment 
discrimination context. 272 F.3d at 1017. Although the reference to a "Gordian Knot" 
literally refers to "[a]n intricate knot tied by King Gordius of Phrygia and cut by 
Alexander the Great with his sword after hearing an oracle promise that whoever could 
undo it would be the next ruler of Asia," see AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference. 
com/search?q=gordian%20knot, it more figuratively refers to "an inextricable 
difficulty; and to cut the Gordian knot is to remove a difficulty by bold and energetic 
measures." See Datasegment.com Online Dictionary, at http://onlinedictionary. 
datasegment.com/word/gordian+knot (last visited June 26, 2005). 
141. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1016. The case of Koski v. Gainer was initially 
filed against the Illinois State Police in May of 1992. See id. at 1011. In the case, 
different groups of white males alleged reverse discrimination under both 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 ("Section 1983"), and Title VII, with regard to both hiring and promotion by the 
Illinois State Police. See Koski v. Gainer, No. 92-C-3293, 1999 WL 438910, at *1 
(N.D. III. June 22, 1999). The promotion discrimination aspects of the case under Title 
VII appear to have been decided by the district court at a bench trial in 1998. See 
Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1011-12; see also Koski, 1999 WL 438910, at *1 (outlining the 
relief received by seven prevailing plaintiffs in the promotion part of the case). 
142. See Bishop, 212 F.3d at 1016-17. 
143. See id. at 1015. As this was a pattern and practice employment 
discrimination case involving systemic disparate treatment, well-established precedent 
under the Teamsters-Franks line of cases, see supra note 122, required the defendants to 
prove that each of the plaintiffs of the class was not entitled to relief because the plaintiff 
had already proven by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had engaged 
in an unlawful pattern and practice of employment discrimination. See Teamsters, 431 
U.S. at 361. As the Court stated in Teamsters: 
If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the 
[plaintift]'s prima facie case, a trial court may then conclude that a violation 
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Each of these three prevailing plaintiffs objected to the application of the 
lost chance approach and argued that each of them should have been 
awarded the full value of the job for their unlawful discriminatory 
treatment. 144 
In denying the plaintiffs their requested relief, Judge Terence T. 
Evans, writing for the Seventh Circuit majority, first noted that to award 
full compensation to all three plaintiffs, especially where two were 
competing for the same job, would not only be wrong, but "obviously 
wrong. "145 Harkening back to the hypothetical offered by Judge Posner 
in Doll involving multiple candidates for a single promotion, 146 the 
Bishop court maintained that the traditional ali-or-nothing approach to 
situations such as these would inevitably lead to windfall recoveries for 
plaintiffs. 147 Instead, the appellate court agreed with the district court in 
using the "tort approach" based on the loss of a chance. 148 
Under this approach, the district court calculated the plaintiffs' 
damages by assessing their chances of receiving the competitive 
promotion in the absence of discrimination. 149 For instance, two of the 
three plaintiffs placed third and fourth respectively on a promotion list, 
but the person who placed first accepted a different job, and the person 
who placed second had been out of the particular district, and therefore, 
the court reduced his chances of actually accepting the promotion to 
only 25%. 150 Although not fully explaining how he arrived at his 
numbers, the district judge found that the plaintiffs who placed third and 
fourth on the promotion had a 45% chance and 30% chance of receiving 
/d. 
has occurred and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further 
evidence from the [plaintiff], a court's finding of a pattern or practice 
justifies an award of prospective relief. 
144. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015. Nothing in the Teamsters decision, 
however, suggests that the relief awarded to individual plaintiffs within a group or class 
must be "full" relief. See generally 431 U.S. 324. Indeed, the Teamster Court 
observed that a trial court must hold mini-hearings in the damage phase of these cases in 
order to award appropriate relief to each member of the class. See id. at 361 ("When 
the [class] seeks individual relief for the victims of the discriminatory practice, a district 
court must usually conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to 
determine the scope of individual relief."). 
145. See Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015-16. As the Bishop court stated: "What 
plaintiffs are really complaining about is that they did not each make a full recovery, 
which, as we shall see, at least in the case of [two of the plaintiffs], would have caused 
the [Illinois State Police] to pay double damages. 'Obviously' not the right result." 
146. See supra note 135. 
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the promotion, respectively, and thus, were entitled to only that 
percentage of the value of the job. 151 
While the appellate court recognized that lost chance theory 
involved "more art than science," 152 it nevertheless approved the theory 
for these types of employment discrimination cases, finding that similar 
types of calculations are made all the time in other contexts, such as in 
comparative negligence cases. 153 Perhaps more importantly, the use of 
lost chance theory in this context struck the court as the "likeliest way to 
arrive at a just result," and thus, it fully affirmed the lost chance 
calculations of the district court. 154 
C. Biondo v. City of Chicago: Applying Lost Chance Theory to 
Speculative Future Promotions 
Since Doll, and in fact even since Bishop, there has been only a 
smattering of cases that have applied the lost chance theory to 
employment discrimination cases. 155 Indeed, the author was only able to 
find two such cases outside of the Seventh Circuit. 156 Nevertheless, as 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. /d. at 1016-17; see also supra note 77. 
154. Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1017. 
155. Drews v. Social Dev. Comm., 95 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989 (E.D. Wis. 1998) 
(awarding the plaintiff 12.5% of salary and fringe benefits for a better job for which 
eight others also applied); Farley v. Miller Fluid Power Corp., No. 94-C-2273, 1997 
WL 757863, at *3 (N.D. lll. Nov. 24, 1997) (denying a motion in limine to exclude all 
evidence of the plaintiffs alleged lost chance of promotion); Adams v. City of Chicago, 
No. 94-C-5727, 1996 WL 137660, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1996) (concluding that the 
plaintiffs' argument, that retroactive promotions are not a plausible remedy for the 
injury of denial of an opportunity to compete for a promotion, is not likely to succeed 
because of the availability of the lost chance theory); cf. Liebig-Grigsby v. United 
States, No. 00-C-4922, 2003 WL 1090272, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2003) 
(finding that, when a government employer refused to refer an employee to a 
neurosurgeon and the employee lost a 70% to 80% chance of halting further 
deterioration of her spinal cord as a result, the employee was entitled to the same 
percentage of the total damage award). 
156. See Evans v. Potter, 215 F.R.D. 571, 574 (D.S.D. 2003) (applying a 
mandatory joinder analysis under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 
Albright v. New Orleans, 208 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640-41 (E.D. La. 2002) (relying on 
expert testimony to establish the value of the lost promotion to each plaintiff, and then 
multiplied the promotion value by the probability that each plaintiff would have received 
the promotion). The court in Evans brought up the interesting question of what to do 
when three individuals are denied a promotion in an allegedly unlawfully discriminatory 
manner, but only one of these individuals has actually brought a claim. See 215 F.R.D. 
at 574. It noted that, if it awarded the plaintiff full recovery, such an award might lead 
to inconsistent obligations on the defendant if other courts later found for the other two 
individuals who applied for the same job. See id. As such, using Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants sought mandatory joinder of the other potential 
plaintiffs as necessary parties. See id. (requiring "'a substantial risk' of inconsistent or 
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witnessed by the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Biondo, 157 the 
Seventh Circuit remains steadfast in applying the lost chance theory to 
probabilistic injuries in employment discrimination cases, even when 
such cases involve speculative future promotions. 
In Biondo, nineteen firefighters and engineers sued the City of 
Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and Title VII for 
reverse race discrimination when they were not promoted to the rank of 
lieutenant after taking a oeompetitive promotion examination in 1986. 158 
They alleged that the City of Chicago had maintained racially segregated 
promotion lists, and that in the absence of these lists, they would have 
been promoted to lieutenant. 159 Moreover, these plaintiffs maintained 
that there was some likelihood that after becoming lieutenants, they 
would have sought further promotions to the rank of captain and 
battalion chief. 160 After finding in the plaintiffs' favor, the district court 
ordered various forms of injunctive relief and utilized the lost chance 
method to determine the value of the probabilistic injuries each of these 
firefighters and engineers suffered. 161 
Although neither the parties nor the Seventh Circuit quarreled with 
the central approach of the district court in using the lost chance theory 
to determine the value of these probabilistic injuries, some of the results 
arrived at by the juries162 were baffling. 163 Consequently, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, writing for the appellate panel, reevaluated the evidence on 
his way to vacating the damage award with instructions for the district 
court to follow on remand. 164 
First, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that all of the plaintiffs should 
receive 100% of the value of the lieutenant promotions, retroactive to 
when they would have received the promotion in the absence of the 
multiple obligations before joinder is necessary") (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2)(ii)). 
In the end, the court ordered joinder of the other potential plaintiffs in order to avoid 
posing inconsistent obligations on the defendant. See id. Unfortunately, there is no 
further published history of this case concerning what happened after the mandatory 
joinder was required. 
157. 382 F.3d 680. 
158. 382 F.3d at 682-83. 
159. /d. at 683. 
160. !d. at 684-85. 
161. /d. at 688. As the court stated: "The City does not dispute the district 
court's central approach: asking the jury to determine the probability that being held 
back in 1986 cost the plaintiffs later chances for advancement. This 'loss of a chance' 
method is the best way to handle probabilistic injuries." /d. 
162. Two different juries actually heard the case. See id. at 683, 685. 
163. For instance, with respect to one of the plaintiffs, the jury determined that 
he had a 90% chance of becoming a captain and a 100% chance of becoming a battalion 
chief, even though one must become a captain before they are eligible for the battalion 
chief position. See id. at 688. 
164. See id. at 690-92. 
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discriminatory selection method. 165 Unlike a situation in which there are 
multiple candidates for just one position, 166 this case provided an 
example in which the first promotion was never in doubt in the absence 
of the racially segregated selection test; but, it was unclear whether, and 
how successful, these same firefighters and engineers would have been 
if they applied for later promotions to the captain and thereafter, to the 
battalion chief positions. 167 Judge Easterbrook estimated that promoted 
lieutenants in the Chicago Fire Department had about a 33% chance of 
subsequently attaining the captain position. 168 He also calculated that 
once becoming a captain, firefighters had a 41% chance of then 
becoming a battalion chief. 169 As a result, he calculated the chance of 
rising from the lieutenant position to the battalion chief position at 
14%Y0 Overall, Judge Easterbrook concluded his damage calculation 
165. Because there were enough positions available for all plaintiffs to receive 
promotions to the lieutenant position, and all would have been promoted absent the use 
of racially discriminatory selection criteria, each plaintiff had a 100% chance of 
receiving the promotion absent discrimination. See id. at 688 ("[I]f a person would have 
had a 25% chance of promotion from lieutenant to captain, then preventing that person 
from bci:oming a lieutenant should lead to a remedy equal to 100% of the benefits of 
being a lieutenant plus 25% of the incremental benefits of being a captain."). Judge 
Easterbrook observed, however, that this calculation will only hold true if we are to 
assume that all of the plaintiffs are risk neutral. See id. Although he admits that such 
plaintiffs would likely be risk averse and pay to reduce the risk (so that the proper award 
should be something less than the actuarial value), for simplicity sake he continues on 
with his risk neutral assumption. See id. 
166. This was the case in both Bishop and Doll. See supra Part II.A-B. 
167. Biondo, 382 F.3d. at 690. Additionally, the plaintiffs made their lost 
chance showing more difficult by failing to provide comparative evidence of how 
similarly situated white firefighters and engineers who were promoted to lieutenant 
subsequently fared on later the captain and battalion chief competitive examinations. /d. 
at 689. Instead, the plaintiffs merely adduced evidence about their education and 
experience and the fact that they loved their work, were committed to the fire 
department, strived to succeed, and studied hard for the promotion tests. /d. Judge 
Easterbrook found that this evidence, however, did not permit the quantification of the 
chance lost by not being initially promoted in 1986. /d. Although I agree with Judge 
Easterbrook concerning most of this evidence, testimony concerning education and 
experience can be helpful in quantifying the chance a discriminated-against plaintiff had 
in obtaining a desired position. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
168. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. Judge Easterbrook appeared to be following the 
analytical framework established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 
Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections in which the court stated that, "[i]n an 
ideal situation, where the data is available and the parties cooperative, a court could 
determine what would be the progression of an average worker with the basic 
qualifications possessed by the injured party." 5 F.3d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1993). 
Moreover, "[t]he burden of proof would then be on the defendant to prove that the 
plaintiff would have performed more poorly than the average and the burden of proof 
would be on the plaintiff to show that she would have performed better than that 
average." /d. 
169. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. 
110. The I4% figure is arrived at by applying the conjunction principle and 
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by stating that "[o]n remand each of the 13 [plaintiffs who have stopped 
short of captain] is entitled to all of the benefits he would have received 
from a timely promotion to lieutenant, plus 33% of the benefits available 
from promotion to captain. "171 Additionally, for the ten plaintiffs who 
the jury believed had a chance of achieving the battalion chief level, 
they would receive an additional 14% of the value of the battalion chief 
position benefits. 172 
Thus, Biondo represents yet another example of how the lost 
chance method may be utilized to determine difficult remedial issues. 173 
But, unlike the Doll and Bishop decisions, which involved only the 
determination of the probability of multiple candidates receiving a 
promotion for one available job, Biondo provides a future promotions 
scenario with the additional complication of determining the future 
career paths of many plaintiffs who have been denied advancement in 
the midst of their careers. 174 Although the "average worker" followed 
by Judge Easterbrook175 in Biondo is less than perfect, especially in the 
absence of specific comparative evidence, its calculations nevertheless 
appear to provide a skilled approximation of the probabilistic injuries 
suffered by these types of plaintiffs. 176 
multiplying the initial chance of becoming a captain (33%) by the subsequent chance of 
becoming a battalion chief (41 %). See id.; see also supra note 65. Again, being able to 
recover for a 14% Joss of chance (as in Herskovits) is consistent with the 10% de 
minimis threshold argued for in this Article. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying 
text. 
171. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. 
172. See id. Moreover, because "[al change in the promotion probabilities and 
dates requires everything else to be redone," Judge Easterbrook also instructed the 
district court on remand to recalculate the equitable remedies (including back pay, front 
pay, and entitlement to seniority and pensions), and hold a new trial limited to the 
recalculation of "back pay and damages for emotional distress on the assumption that 
each of the plaintiffs who has yet to reach captain lost a 33% chance of promotion by 
2002." /d. But see infra note 240 (asserting that lost chance analysis should not be part 
of the compensatory damage analysis undertaken by the jury in an employment 
discrimination case). 
173. See Biondo, 382 F.3d. at 690 (using the lost chance method to determine 
damages). But see United States v. City of Miami, 195 F.3d 1292, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 
1999) (addressing a similar promotion case in which the court avoided a quagmire of 
hypothetical judgments associated with the lost chance theory and instead awarded a 
class-wide remedy, giving each eligible plaintiff in each ranking level a pro rata share). 
174. See Griffin, 5 F.3d at 189 (discussing the difficulty of determining the 
appropriate relief in cases in which an initial unlawful discriminatory employment action 
may cost the plaintiff chances for later career advancement). 
175. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. The "average worker" approach was actually 
first suggested by Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit in Griffin. See 5 F.3d at 189. 
176. As will be discussed below, the ideal situation for lost chance analysis in 
the employment discrimination context would permit a fact finder to engage in individual 
fact-finding to approximate as closely as possible the chance the individual had to obtain 
a position prior to the discrimination. See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text. 
The "average worker" test, however, may be useful in cases like Biondo as a substitute 
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Ill. CONSIDERATIONS ADVISING AGAINST ADOPTING PURE LOST 
CHANCE THEORY IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
Although Doll involved language contemplating the utilization of a 
pure version of lost chance theory in the employment discrimination 
context, 177 neither Bishop nor Biondo consider the efficacy of pure lost 
chance theory in this context. 178 Consequently, it is necessary to 
consider whether courts in the future should adopt a pure lost chance 
theory to calculate the value of probabilistic injuries in the employment 
discrimination context. This Article posits that the adoption of such an 
approach would be inappropriate for two primary reasons. First, from a 
statutory standpoint, pure lost chance theory primarily satisfies the 
private, "make whole" relief goal of employment discrimination law, 
while failing to give sufficient attention to the public interests that such 
laws are also intended to serve. Second, from a prudential standpoint, 
the pure version of lost chance gives zealous defense counsel an 
additional opportunity to confuse the remedial issues for the fact finder, 
and by extension, may significantly add to the administrative costs 
associated with the litigation of such disputes. 179 
A. Statutory Concerns Regarding Pure Lost Chance Theory 
Although allowing defendant employers the ability to set off 
employment discrimination awards by the probability that the plaintiff 
would have received the job in better-than-even-chance cases appears to 
be a logical extension of themes underlying lost chance theory, 180 under 
closer scrutiny, it is not compatible with one of the central purposes of 
when there are no suitable individual comparators, or in class action situations in which 
it would be too expensive and time consuming to engage in mini-hearings to determine 
the exact loss of chance suffered by each member of a voluminous class. See ROBERT 
BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON EQUAUTY IN THE WORKPLACE 795-96 (6th ed. 1999). 
177. See supra Part Il.A. 
178. This is because neither Bishop nor Biondo involved fact scenarios in which 
the plaintiffs had more than a 50% chance of receiving a promotion, as Doll speculated 
might be the situation in some circumstances. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206. 
/d. 
179. See Ellis, supra note 23, at 372. As Lori Ellis wrote: 
It seems likely that in jurisdictions that have already adopted loss of chance 
for cases below fifty-one percent, the defense bar may advocate extending 
loss of chance to better-than-even cases in an effort to limit damages to the 
value of the 'lost chance' rather than full damages for wrongful death. 
180. See King, supra note 5, at 1387 (advocating the application of lost chance 
theory to better-than-even-chance cases); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 66, at 253 
(advocating the adoption of a pure form of lost chance theory in the tort context to avoid 
systematic overcompensation of plaintiffs and overdeterrence of defendants). 
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employment discrimination law. 181 As discussed above, Title VII and 
other similar employment discrimination laws were enacted by Congress 
not only to provide a private remedy for those unlawfully discriminated 
against, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to serve the public goal 
of eliminating unlawful discrimination from the American economy. 182 
In order to take into account both the private and the public statutory 
purposes of employment discrimination laws, courts should be able to 
overcompensate plaintiffs with "punitive-type" equitable relief in cases 
in which a better-than-even chance of proving discrimination has been 
established in order to satisfy the larger public interest goals of 
employment discrimination law. 183 
Punitive-type equitable relief does not mean the traditional 
monetary punitive damages that have been available for intentional 
discrimination under Title VII since Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 (" 1991 Act"). 184 Rather, punitive-type equitable relief in 
181. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 421 (establishing eradication of 
discrimination throughout the economy as one of the central statutory purposes of Title 
VII). 
182. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (discussing the broad public purposes of Title VII in the 
voluntary affirmative action context); Franks, 424 U.S. at 771; Albemarle Paper, 422 
U.S. at 421. 
183. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 764 ("[F]ederal courts are empowered to fashion 
such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, 
making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring."); see 
also Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294-95 (2002) ("[W]hile punitive damages benefit the 
individual employee, they also serve an obvious public function in deterring future 
violations."). This approach for providing punitive-like equitable relief in lost chance 
cases in the employment discrimination context should be viewed as consistent with 
Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell's basic point that punitive damages 
make sense from a deterrence standpoint "if, and only if, an injurer has a chance of 
escaping liability for the harm he causes." See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 874 (1998). Here, 
unless we utilize punitive-type equitable relief, there is a significant chance that the 
public-regarding aspects of employment discrimination law wiii go unfulfilled. See id. 
at 939-40 (suggesting that, although foreseeing some problems, "if there is a component 
of harm that otherwise would be omitted, a policy of including it in the form of punitive 
damages would seem to be beneficial"). And, although Polinsky and Shavell refer to 
these monetary awards as "damages," and this Article refers to them as "equitable 
relief," the distinction is really semantic if at the end of the day the plaintiff is 
compensated monetarily for the violation of the public interest caused by the employer's 
wrongful conduct. 
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Under the 1991 Act, it is now clearly established 
that punitive damages are available in Title VII and the ADA cases in which an 
employer has engaged in "discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." /d. § 
1981a(b)(1). The Supreme Court has further elucidated this standard in Kolstad v. 
American Dental Ass 'n by focusing on whether an employer discriminated against an 
employee in the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate federal law. 527 
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this sense constitutes a remedy that a court may deem appropriate in 
order to effectuate the purposes of the statute. 185 In this regard, this 
relief will serve not so much to "punish" a specific employer for 
particularly egregious conduct, 186 but more to satisfy the broader 
statutory mandate of deterring all employers throughout the economy 
from engaging in unlawful employment discrimination. 
Clearly, individual plaintiffs in better-than-even-chance cases will 
not object if they receive the full value of the job they have more likely 
than not lost through unlawful discrimination. Employers, on the other 
hand, will maintain that they should be on the hook only for the damage 
they actually caused. 187 There are at least three responses to these 
employers. First, to the extent that the employer has discriminated and 
has made it impossible to determine the exact chance a plaintiff would 
have had to obtain the position in the absence of discrimination, he 
should not now be permitted to use that uncertainty as a legal sword to 
U.S. 526, 536 (1999). Moreover, in this context, punitive damages cannot be imputed 
to the employer if the employer can prove that the employment decisions of its 
managerial agents were contrary to its good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. See 
id. at 545. 
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) ("[T]he court may ... order ... any other 
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."); see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 770 
("The fashioning of appropriate remedies invokes the sound equitable discretion of the 
district courts."). This broad equitable power is believed to have been based upon 
similar language in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA "), which permits the 
National Labor Relations Board to "take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate 
the policies of [the] NLRA." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 769 
n.29 ("To the extent that there is a difference in the wording of the respective 
provisions, § 706(g) grants, if anything, broader discretionary powers than those granted 
the National Labor Relations Board."). 
186. It is generally agreed that one of the central purposes of punitive damages 
is to punish an employer for especially outrageous conduct on the employer's part. See 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); see also 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 183, at 948 ("By the punishment objective [of punitive 
damages] we refer to society's goal of imposing appropriate sanctions on blameworthy 
parties. "). 
187. See Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990) ("It should be a self-
evident principle of tort law that valuation of allowable damages 'is animated by a 
premise similar to that underlying causation: that a tortfeasor should be charged only 
with the value of the interest he destroyed.'") (quoting King, supra note 5, at 1356). 
Such an argument is also consistent with an efficiency argument under a law and 
economics approach. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability 
Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 119, 124 (2003); see also Saul Levmore, 
Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 
692 (1990) ("The legal system is viewed as aiming to transfer payments from 
wrongdoers to the victims they harm, and deviations from this norm are regarded as 
errors."); Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 183, at 939 ("[O]ur basic analysis of 
deterrence implies that injurers should have to pay for the entire harm they cause, in 
order that injurers take appropriate precautions and that prices and participation in risky 
activities are proper."). 
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reduce his damage exposure. 188 If anything, such employers should have 
to suffer from the uncertainty caused by their unlawful conduct, not the 
wronged plaintiff. 189 
Second, the Supreme Court has again and again emphasized the 
prophylactic purposes of employment discrimination law. 190 
Employment discrimination law is not just about compensating victims, 
or even deterring employer conduct, but rather seeks to give employers 
the incentive to take preventative steps to make the workplace more 
welcoming to all. 191 Thus, if an employer reasonably seeks to prevent 
sexual harassment in the workplace, and the employee unreasonably 
fails to take advantage of such preventative opportunities or otherwise 
fails to avoid harm, the employer has an affirmative defense against 
vicarious liability in such cases. 192 Similarly, in the punitive damages 
context, if the employer attempts in good faith to follow the dictates of 
Title VII, whatever the egregiousness of the supervisor's conduct, the 
employer will not be found liable for punitive damages. 193 Likewise, an 
award of full equitable relief in these better-than-even-chance cases can 
be seen as an additional incentive for employers to take preventative 
action before misconduct diminishes an opportunity for hiring or 
advancement in the workplace. 194 
Third, perhaps the best argument is that the lost chance doctrine 
should never apply in a better-than-even-chance case. 195 As courts and 
commentators alike have argued, once a plaintiff is able to show, by the 
preponderance of the evidence, that it is more likely than not that the 
defendant caused her ultimate injury, there is no need to identify the 
188. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 3 ("When defendants bear responsibility for 
the gap in evidence, the case is especially strong [to relax the preponderance 
threshold}."); see also United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1098-99 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to 
consider the probability of the plaintiff being hired and instead construed ambiguities 
against the employer); Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1406-07 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(finding that, because the defendant was unable to show how many promotions were 
available, ambiguities were resolved against the employer and each plaintiff was 
awarded full back pay as if they had received the promotion). 
189. See King, supra note 5, at 1378. A similar argument has been made for 
shifting accident costs to manufacturers under a strict liability theory in the products 
liability context. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in 
Products liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 931-32 (1981). 
190. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545 ("[Title V1I]'s 'primary objective' is 'a 
prophylactic one,' it aims, chiefly, 'not to provide redress but to avoid harm."') (quoting 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06; and Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417). 
191. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 
192. See id. at 806-07; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 762-63. 
193. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545. 
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
195. See Ellis, supra note 23, at 372. 
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 781 2005
2005:747 A Public Interest Model 781 
harm as the loss of the opportunity. 196 In other words, loss of chance 
doctrine only provides for a percentage of damages based on the 
probability of a favorable outcome in the absence of the defendant's 
unlawful conduct. But, if a plaintiff under the traditional ali-or-nothing 
approach can establish that it is more likely than not that the wrongdoer 
caused the ultimate harm, there is no need to depend on the subsidiary 
theory and its lesser compensations. 197 
Thus, both traditional causation standards and the public nature of 
employment discrimination statutes support a modified approach to lost 
chance theory in the employment discrimination context. To the extent 
overcompensation is argued to result as a consequence of this remedial 
scheme, 198 such additional compensation should be seen as an equitable 
remedy necessary to effectuate the broader public deterrence purposes of 
employment discrimination statutes. 199 
B. Prudential Concerns Regarding Pure Lost Chance Theory 
In addition to the important statutory concerns regarding the public-
oriented nature of employment discrimination law, further prudential 
considerations counsel against adopting the pure lost chance theory in 
the employment discrimination context. These prudential concerns can 
be grouped into two main areas. 
First, and chief among these concerns, are the perverse incentives 
196. See id.; see also Donnini v. Ouano, 810 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1991) (limiting the application of lost chance theory to not-better-than-even-chance 
cases). But see Kieffer, supra note 9, at 573 (arguing that not applying lost chance to 
better-than-even-chance cases is inconsistent with current efforts to curb perceived 
excesses of the tort system). 
197. See Ellis, supra note 23, at 372 ("[Loss of chance] should be understood as 
a 'techniqueD for mitigating the perceived injustice' of granting summary judgments or 
directed verdicts to all doctors who act negligently toward patients with a not-better-
than-even chance of survival.") (quoting DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 157 (1989)); see also McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosps., 725 
N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (Ohio 2000) ("[W]e never intended to force [the lost chance] theory 
on a plaintiff who could otherwise prove that specific negligent acts of the defendant 
caused the ultimate harm."); Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34) (suggesting that the 
only type of case in which the "novel" loss of a chance claim makes sense is where 
patients had a chance of survival of less than 50% even in the absence of negligence). 
198. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206 ("[T]hough to avoid the opposite evils of 
overcompensation and overdeterrence [lost chance} ... must be applied across the 
board, that is, to high-probability as well as to low-probability [employment 
discrimination] cases."). Judge Posner's pure lost approach is consistent with a law and 
economics precept favored in all types of proportional liability cases; that is "the central 
idea ... that a defendant should pay for damages incurred discounted by the probability 
that the defendant caused the damages." GREEN, supra note 2, at 9 n.22; see also 
Makdisi, supra note 2, at 1073. 
199. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text. 
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that defense counsel will have to confuse and mislead the judge or jury200 
to reduce the amount of her client's liability. 201 Such incentives will 
inevitably occur because almost no plaintiff in a competitive hiring or 
promotion case will be able to prove that she had an absolute, 100% 
chance of receiving a position. 202 A loss of a chance argument will 
normally be available to defense counsel to argue that in the absence of 
discrimination, there were many other reasons why the employee did not 
receive the position. 203 Consequently, the record of these cases will be 
further clouded as various forms of complex evidence are adduced to 
approximate the exact chance a plaintiff had of receiving a job.204 
Second, the additional administrative costs introduced into these 
types of employment discrimination cases by way of the pure lost chance 
theory must be considered. Law and economics scholars refer to 
administrative costs as "the legal and other expenses and costs 
[including time and effort] borne by parties in resolving disputes that 
arise when harm occurs. "205 There is little doubt that the added 
complexity of lost chance theory will exacerbate to some degree the 
administrative costs associated with litigation.206 Parties will likely seek 
200. It is more likely that judges will make lost chance calculations in 
employment discrimination cases because they determine equitable remedies such as 
back pay and front pay. See, e.g., Bishop, 272 F.3d at 1015 (calculating the equitable 
remedies in a pattern and practice employment discrimination case). But see Biondo, 
382 F.3d at 688 (addressing a case in which lost chance calculations in an employment 
discrimination case led to "inexplicable verdict[s]" concerning certain members of the 
class). To the extent that judges rather than juries resolve these issues, it may be harder 
for defense counsel to confuse more sophisticated jurists with this type of evidence and 
the concomitant calculations. But see infra note 207. 
20 I. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 365. 
202. See GREEN, supra note 2, at 5 ("Evidence is never perfect; uncertainty 
always exists."). 
203. A similar defense exists for employers under the "same decision" test in 
mixed-motive cases under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
204. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 365. Although one can make the argument 
that defendants in traditional tort cases also seek to cloud the record to benefit their 
clients in marginal cases (that is, cases in which it is a close call as to whether traditional 
causation can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence), there is certainly less 
reason why we should encourage defense counsel to engage in this tactic in cases where 
meeting the preponderance standard is never in doubt (that is, where the only question is 
whether it was 95% likely that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury versus 90% 
likely). 
205. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 
(2004). More specifically, administrative considerations include the volume of suits, the 
probability of litigation given suit, and the average expense of litigation. See Steven 
Shavell, Uncenainty over Causation and the Detennination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & 
EcON. 587, 604 (1985). 
206. See Shavell, supra note 205, at 604 ("[A]dministrative costs would be 
higher under the proportional approach than under a probability threshold criterion."). 
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to present dueling experts and adduce intricate evidence concerning the 
probability of an individual receiving a particular position. 207 
However, to the extent that these lost chance awards are limited to 
equitable relief such as back pay, reinstatement, and front pay, judges 
will be the ones considering statistical evidence and dueling experts.208 
Although by no means error-proof, judges will be more likely to 
minimize the additional administrative costs this type of evidence will no 
doubt cause. Recent case law suggests, however, that juries will be 
involved in these lost chance calculations in employment discrimination 
cases as these damages may not only involve equitable relief, but also 
emotional distress damages, and potentially, punitive damages.209 
Compensatory and punitive damages are remedial issues that a plaintiff 
may decide to have a jury determine under the 1991 Act. 210 Given this 
fact, the minimization of administrative costs through the use of judges 
in these cases is somewhat questionable. 
In short, prudential considerations also counsel against adoption of 
207. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 365 ("If complicated statistical data would 
not be enough to make a juror's eyes glaze over, the potentially endless stream of 
experts who could testify on the patient's membership in a group that would have 
responded favorably to early diagnosis or treatment would probably finish the job."). 
208. In an employment discrimination case involving a probabilistic injury, not 
only will a plaintiff seek equitable remedies like back pay, front pay, and various forms 
of injunctive and declaratory relief, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), but at least under Title 
VII and the ADA, she will likely also seek compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a. Although a jury alone could award compensatory and punitive 
damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c), the judge could award back pay and front pay as 
equitable remedies to place the plaintiff in the position she would have been in absent the 
discriminatory conduct. See Pollard v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 
847-48 (2001) ("Plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the basis of sex 
traditionally have been entitled to such remedies as injunctions, reinstatement, backpay, 
lost benefits, and attorney's fees under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ") 
(citations omitted). Pollard also makes clear that front pay is a type of equitable relief 
under Title VII. Id. at 854 (finding that front pay is a type of equitable remedy under 
Section 706(g) of Title VII). In this sense, lost chance theory in the employment 
discrimination context may have a decided advantage over its tort law counterpart to the 
extent that judges rather than juries will be handling these complex probabilistic 
calculations. But see Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3 n.3) (discussing computation 
blunders made by judges in loss of a chance cases). 
209. See Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. Traditional punitive damages would 
probably not be available in lost chance employment discrimination cases, as it makes 
less sense to say that an employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice ... with malice 
or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved 
individual," see 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(l), when the plaintiff had only lost less than a 
50% chance of receiving a competitive position. This is even more so considering the 
Kolstad court's emphasis on the employer's state of mind, rather than the egregiousness 
of the conduct. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(c)(l) ("(c) Jury trial-If a complaining party seeks 
compensatory or punitive damages under this section-(!) any party may demand a trial 
by jury .... "). 
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the pure lost chance theory in better-than-even-chance employment 
discrimination cases because it inappropriately provides additional 
opportunities to cloud the remedial issues and needlessly increases 
administrative costs to the litigation system. 
IV. A PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL FOR APPLYING LOST CHANCE THEORY 
TO PROBABILISTIC INJURIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
A. Setting Up the Employment Discrimination Litigation Context for 
Lost Chance Theory 
In place of pure lost chance theory, this Article advances a public 
interest approach for remedying probabilistic injuries in employment 
discrimination litigation. Before setting out the components of this 
approach, however, it is important to first set out the legal framework 
for an employment discrimination case to establish at what points the 
lost chance analysis may come into play. 
In a run-of-the-mill intentional employment discrimination case211 
under Title VII,212 the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the 
preponderance of the evidence that she suffered an adverse employment 
action because of her race, sex, color, national origin, or religion. 213 
Although there may be different proof frameworks available to the 
plaintiff depending upon the type of evidence available, 214 and based on 
whether the case involves an individual or a group, 215 the first part of 
211. Although there is no evident reason why the public interest model to lost 
chance theory set forth herein cannot apply to disparate impact claims under section 
703(k) of Title VII, id. § 2000e-2(k), for ease of analysis, the following narrative 
assumes an intentional, disparate treatment employment discrimination case involving 
either an individual or a group of plaintiffs. See id. § 2000e-2(a). 
212. Although this analysis utilizes Title VII, the same approach to employment 
discrimination cases generally also exists under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a, the 
Rehabilitation Act, id. § 791, Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title I of the ADA, 
id. §§ 12101-12118. 
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m). 
214. In individual hiring or promotion cases, a plaintiff may proceed under the 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green pretext framework. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (setting forth the framework 
established under McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). A plaintiff may also 
proceed under the mixed-motive framework codified by the 1991 Act. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Nevertheless, there is some question whether the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis remains viable as a consequence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see also 
Dare v. Wai-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991-92 (D. Minn. 2003) 
(questioning the continuing validity of the McDonnell Douglas framework in light of 
Desert Palace). Regardless of how one comes down on this issue, it should not have 
any impact on the analysis herein. 
215. As discussed above, the Teamsters framework applies to systemic disparate 
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any such employment discrimination case consists of a plaintiff 
establishing liability for unlawful discrimination under the applicable 
framework by the preponderance of the evidence.216 Moreover, up to 
the point when liability attaches, lost chance theory should not play any 
role in the legal analysis. 217 
Once liability has been established, the defendant may have various 
substantive defenses at its disposal to either reduce or completely defeat 
the amount of damages. ·For instance, in a mixed-motive case under 
Title VII, the defendant can substantially diminish the amount of 
damages by establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have made the. same decision regarding the plaintiff even in the 
absence of unlawful discrimination. 218 Similarly, in a group disparate 
treatment case, although a presumption of liability for every plaintiff in 
a group or class is established once liability is proven, the employer may 
establish that an individual plaintiff in the group is entitled to less or no 
relief. 219 
As far as the interaction between these employment discrimination 
substantive defenses and lost chance theory, Judge Posner has suggested 
that a district judge could "apply [the defendant's burden of proof] to 
probabilities as distinct from certainties of loss. "22° For instance, 
[i]f ... the government is able to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Doll had no more than a 20 percent 
chance of being appointed foreman in lieu of [the other 
applicant] (had the Veterans Administration complied with the 
Rehabilitation Act), it will be open to the district judge to 
treatment cases under Title VII. As in the individual intentional discrimination cases, 
the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the plaintiffs during the liability phases of the 
trial to prove unlawful discrimination. See supra note 122. 
216. Regardless of which framework is utilized, "[t]he ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
217. Although issues of causation must be decided during the liability phase of 
employment discrimination litigation, lost chance only involves the reconceptualizing of 
the harm caused by the defendant and then the valuation of that harm. See GREEN, 
supra note 2, at 4 (recognizing that reconceptualizing the interest harmed is at the heart 
of the lost chance approach). 
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (providing that the plaintiff is limited 
to declaratory relief, specific types of injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs if the 
defendant meets the same decision test). Importantly, if the defendant is able to satisfy 
the same decision test, no form of monetary damages or equitable relief is available. 
See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). 
219. See supra note 122. Additionally, the defendant may reduce the amount of 
damages by proving that it would have fired the plaintiff anyway based on derogatory 
evidence acquired after the plaintiff was discharged for unlawfully discriminatory 
reasons. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1995). 
220. Doll, 15 F.3d at 1207. 
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 786 2005
786 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
consider whether to award Doll 20 percent of the back pay that 
the judge awarded him in the first round of this litigation. 221 
Thus, once the interest harmed is identified as the opportunity of 
receiving a position, the employer, through its defenses, can adduce 
evidence to seek to establish the loss of chance the plaintiff actually 
suffered. 222 On the other hand, if the defendant cannot meet its burden 
of persuasion under the same decision test or any other substantive 
defense, the fact finder will be free to set the percentage lost based on 
the relevant evidence presented by the parties in the liability phase of the 
case. 223 
B. The Fundamentals of the Public Interest Model 
Having placed the lost chance remedial theory into the larger 
employment discrimination litigation context, the following Sections set 
out the three steps that fact finders should follow in determining how to 
evaluate a loss of a chance caused by the discriminatory denial of a 
competitive position. 
1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE INTEREST HARMED 
First, the court must properly identify the interest lost in such 
probabilistic cases. 224 The interest harmed is not the ultimate job loss 
suffered by the plaintiff, but rather the loss of an opportunity to obtain 
the job without discriminatory conduct being involved. 225 Thus, the 
interest harmed in a competitive hiring or promotion case in the 
employment context is the chance of receiving a position now or in the 
future (for example, as in the Biondo case). 226 With regard to causation, 
the plaintiff must merely show that the employer's discriminatory 
actions were more likely than not the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs loss 
221. /d. 
222. /d. To be clear, in a lost chance case, the employer's defense does not go 
to whether the plaintiff would have received the job absent discrimination, but whether it 
was more likely than not that the defendant's conduct caused a certain percentage of lost 
opportunity in obtaining a job as a result of its unlawful discriminatory conduct. /d. 
223. For a discussion of the relevant evidence a fact finder may rely on to set a 
plaintiff's percentage of chance lost in an employment discrimination case, see infra Part 
IV.B.2. 
224. See supra notes 49-51. 
225. See supra note 66; see also Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1341 ("Courts in 
these cases must distinguish carefully the losses associated with the tort injury from the 
losses associated with the plaintiff's underlying injury. This distinction, however, eludes 
many courts."). 
226. 382 F.3d at 684-85. 
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of a chance.227 In situations where it is quite clear that only one 
employer was involved in discriminatorily not selecting the plaintiff for 
the position in question, establishing that the same employer was the 
"but for" cause of the plaintiff losing a certain quantum of chance 
should be relatively easy to establish. 228 
2. DETERMINATION OF THE PROBABILITY THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD 
HAVE RECEIVED A POSITION ABSENT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION 
Second, the fact finder will have to determine the probabilities of a 
given plaintiff having received a job in the absence of discrimination. 229 
As noted previously, this endeavor is much more art than science, 230 and 
the fact finder will no doubt have to engage in an empirical 
approximation. 231 Nevertheless, there are factors that should play a role 
in determining the relative likelihood that a plaintiff would have received 
a position in the absence of discrimination. 232 For instance, factors such 
as educational background, relevant past job experience, seniority, and 
the score on a validated performance test are all relatively objective 
criteria that the court could use in determining the probability of 
someone receiving a job. 233 In addition, each side could employ experts, 
utilizing comparative data of people who were actually hired or 
promoted, to determine the likelihood of success in the absence of 
discrimination. 234 Finally, the testimony of the plaintiff and other 
227. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4) (observing that even in lost 
chance cases, the plaintiff must still "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant's negligence caused that loss of a chance") (citing King, supra note 5, at 
1394-95); see also Jorgensen, 616 N.W.2d at 370-71; Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1341. 
As the South Dakota Supreme Court wrote in Jorgensen: "As a distinct cause of action, 
the loss of a chance must still be proven under the traditional standard of proof. That is, 
the plaintiff must still prove ... that the defendant's conduct operated to reduce his 
chance of a more favorable outcome." 616 N.W.2d at 370-71, abrogated by legislative 
amendment, S.D. CODIFIED LAws§ 20-9-1. 
228. See Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1342. 
229. See, e.g., Bishop, 212 F.3d at 1016. 
230. Id. at 1016. 
231. See supra note 72. 
232. See, e.g., Biondo, 382 F.3d at 689. 
233. /d. at 689-90. 
234. Weigand, supra note 9, at 310 ("While expert testimony is crucial to all 
medical malpractice claims, it is especially so in loss of chance claims."); Truckor, 
supra note 17, at 364-65; see also Albright, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41 (relying on 
expert testimony to establish the value of the lost promotion to each plaintiff, and then 
multiplying the promotion value by the probability that each plaintiff would have 
received the promotion). Of course, to the extent that the administrative costs become 
too steep because this type of complex and costly evidence must be adduced for a large 
number of plaintiffs in a class, one could instead rely on the average worker theory 
utilized by Judge Easterbrook in Biondo. 382 F.3d at 690 ("Because none of the 
plainti~fs presented comparative evidence, the view most favorable to the plaintiffs as a 
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relevant third parties may provide valuable information for a judge 
seeking to approximate the probability of a plaintiff receiving a job in 
the absence of discrimination. 235 
Once the judge calculates the initial chance that an individual 
plaintiff had at receiving a given job, the loss of chance calculation is 
simpler in the employment discrimination context than in the tort 
context. 236 This is because once the employer has discriminated against 
the plaintiff so that she can no longer receive a position, the 
postdiscrimination chance at receiving the job is exactly 0%.237 In other 
words, although the plaintiff may eventually receive equitable or 
injunctive relief placing her in the same position she would have been in 
the absence of discrimination, 238 right after the employer discriminated 
against her unlawfully she has no chance of receiving the position that 
has now been filled by someone else. Thus, unlike the tort context in 
which the fact finder must calculate the odds at survival after the 
medical malpractice, no such calculation need take place in the 
employment discrimination context. If the plaintiff had a 25% chance of 
receiving a job prior to discrimination, once she is discriminated against 
and not selected, her loss of chance is also 25%. 
3. DIVIDING PLAINTIFFS INTO APPROPRIATE LOST CHANCE 
CATEGORIES 
Third, and finally, depending upon the probabilities calculated, 
plaintiffs will be divided into three categories: better-than-even-chance 
plaintiffs, not-better-than-even-chance plaintiffs, and de mmtmts 
plaintiffs. 239 For those who are able to establish that they had more than 
group is that each would have done as well as the average lieutenant on the 1992 and 
1998 exams."). 
235. Truckor, supra note 17, at 364-65. But see Biondo, 382 F.3d at 689-90 
(criticizing the use of some of these forms of evidence to determine probabilities). 
236. See Noah, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26). 
237. In this sense, employment discrimination injuries are like those injuries in 
medical malpractice cases where the doctor absolutely destroys any chance a patient had 
at survival. /d. 
238. See supra note 208. 
239. Regardless of whether there is one plaintiff or multiple plaintiffs, the 
employer may still be undercompensating or overcompensating the plaintiff under the 
public interest model. This outcome is the result of the existence of some probability 
that the selected candidate (that is, the individual that is not discriminated against) would 
have been offered the position in the absence of discrimination. See infra tbl.B. The 
advantage of the public interest approach to lost chance, nonetheless, includes the fact 
that less-than-even-chance plaintiffs will receive some compensation for their losses 
caused by a clearly discriminatory employer rather than none. Furthermore, in better-
than-even-chance cases, the overcompensation can be written off as equitable relief 
necessary for the fulfillment of employment discrimination law's public-regarding 
purposes. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. 
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a 50% chance of receiving a job in the absence of discrimination, the 
public interest model awards the full value of the job240 to effectuate the 
public interests sought to be vindicated by employment discrimination 
law. 241 This is also necessary to be consistent with traditional causation 
standards. 242 On the other hand, for those who establish a 50% chance 
or less of receiving a job in the absence of discrimination, lost chance 
theory will be applied to provide the plaintiff with an award that is 
equivalent to the total value of the job multiplied by the percentage of 
the lost chance. 243 Finally, for administrative cost reduction purposes 
and to prevent frivolous claims from reaching the courthouse, those 
plaintiffs establishing less than a 10% chance of receiving a job in the 
absence of discriminatory treatment will be precluded from 
recovering. 244 
C. A Hypothetical Illustration of the Public Interest Model 
To better illustrate how the public interest model will work in 
practice, it is helpful to consider a hypothetical employment 
discrimination case involving the denial of a competitive promotion for 
unlawful discriminatory reasons. Under the facts of this case, ABC 
Corporation has a standard operating procedure of not promoting 
African Americans to positions of responsibility in their organization. 
During the most recent round of promotions, the employer considered 
five applicants for the position of Lead Supervisor, four African 
American employees and one white employee. As a result of the 
selection process, the white applicant was selected. 
240. The "full value of the job" refers primarily to a combination of back pay, 
front pay, or reinstatement, which the judge will determine in her discretion. See supra 
note 208. Even if there is a jury seated to determine compensatory or punitive damages, 
these monetary awards should not impact the judge's lost chance calculations. See 
Biondo, 382 F.3d at 690. This is because the damages for emotional distress and 
egregious conduct will most likely be discounted (or in the case of punitive damages, not 
awarded at all) as a result of the jury considering the likelihood of a plaintiff having 
received a position absent discrimination. Jd. In any event, such calculations should not 
affect the judge's equitable determination concerning what the job is worth in terms of 
back pay, front pay, or reinstatement. /d. 
241. See supra note 25. One additional interesting issue that will need to be 
addressed when determining the "full value of the job" is when the applicable limitations 
period accrues. See Weigand, supra note 9, at 309. Because the interest harmed in loss 
chance cases is the loss of an opportunity, the limitations period should start to run at the 
time the opportunity is denied, not when the ultimate harm occurs. Jd. However, this 
confusion should not arise in the employment discrimination context, as the time the 
opportunity is denied and the time when the ultimate harm occurs are the same. See 
supra Part IV.A.2. 
242. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
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Unhappy with the outcome of the selection process, three out of the 
four African American employees bring a pattern and practice disparate 
treatment case under the Teamsters model alleging a systemic policy of 
unlawfully excluding African Americans from supervisory positions, in 
violation of Title VII. 245 The evidence establishes quite clearly that the 
candidates all had the necessary educational background for the position 
in question, but that the candidates' past relevant job experience could 
be divided into three all-inclusive groups: extensive, moderate, and 
minimal. As it turns out, the white employee selected for the promotion 
had moderate experience. 
The African American employees are able to successfully show 
during the liability phase of the trial that the employer engaged in 
unlawful race discrimination in violation of Title VII. 246 Consequently, 
a presumption is established that each plaintiff is entitled to some level 
of relief. 247 Nevertheless, ABC Corporation still has the ability to show 
that one or more of the individual plaintiffs is not entitled to relief.248 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that ABC Corporation cannot 
meet its burden during the damages phase of the trial,249 the judge250 
turns to the public interest approach to lost chance theory to fashion a 
remedy for the three successful plaintiffs. 
First, the judge identifies the interests harmed by ABC 
Corporation's wrongful actions. The judge identifies the harm as the 
loss of chance of the three African American plaintiffs to receive the 
promotion in question. Next, he determines that one African American 
plaintiff, Plaintiff A with extensive experience, had a 52% chance (that 
is, a better-than-even chance) of receiving the job absent discrimination, 
and therefore, awards the full value of the job to that plaintiff by 
awarding back pay and instating her into the supervisor position.251 
245. For a discussion of the Teamsters framework for systemic disparate 
treatment cases, see supra note 122. 
246. To reiterate, for liability to attach, there is no need to undertake a lost 
chance calculation at this stage of the litigation. See supra Part IV .A. 
247. See supra note 122. 
248. /d. 
249. In a real case, the ABC Corporation might be able to prove that Plaintiff C 
with only minimal experience would not have received the promotion under any 
circumstances. Notice, however, that because the public interest model applies a 10% 
de minimis threshold, the result is the same regardless of the phase in which lost chance 
applies. See supra tbi.A. 
250. For the sake of simplicity, this hypothetical assumes that no compensatory 
or punitive damages are being requested. For a further discussion regarding whether a 
judge or jury should make loss chance calculations in employment discrimination 
litigation, see supra notes 207, 240. 
251. If instatement is inappropriate because of hostility, or because the plaintiff 
is already working at a different job at a different company, front pay may be utilized as 
an equitable remedy to place the plaintiff in the position he would have been in absent 
discrimination. See Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1212 (7th Cir. 
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As for the remaining two African American plaintiffs, Plaintiff B 
has moderate experience and Plaintiff C has minimal experience, thus 
each has a not-better-than-even chance of receiving the position. 
Additionally, the other nonplaintiff African American employee had 
minimal experience. To value the chance of each of these individuals to 
receive the job, the judge establishes in total that these four remaining 
applicants combined (the two remaining plaintiffs, the one African 
American nonplaintiff and the successful white applicant) had a 48% 
chance of receiving the job, and that because of differences in 
experience, the moderate experience candidates had a 16% chance of 
receiving the job, whereas the minimal experience candidates had an 8% 
chance of receiving the job. Based on these valuations, the judge 
awards Plaintiff B 16% of the value of the job and awards Plaintiff C 
nothing under the de minimis exception.252 
Table B 
Hypothetical Applying Lost Chance (Public Interest Model) to ABC 
Corporation Scenario 
Plaintiffs Experience Chance of Remedy 
Obtaining Job 
Plaintiff A Extensive 52% 100% of 
Value of 
Job253 
Plaintiff B Moderate 16% 16% ofValue 
of Job 
Plaintiff C Minimal 8% 0% (De 
Minimis) 
1989) (observing that an award of front pay should make a plaintiff whole in the absence 
of reinstatement). 
252. See supra notes 82-85 for the advantages of adopting de minimis 
exception. 
253. "Value of the job" as utilized in these Tables refers to some combination of 
back pay, front pay, or instatement that represents how much a plaintiff lost by being 
denied a competitive position on the basis of unlawful discrimination. See supra note 
235. 
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Table C 
Hypothetical Applying Lost Chance (Pure Version) to ABC Corporation 
Scenario 
Plaintiffs Experience Chance of Remedy 
Obtaining Job 
Plaintiff A Extensive 52% 52% of 
Value of 
Job 
Plaintiff B Moderate 16% 16% of 
Value of 
Job 




Hypothetical Applying Traditional Ali-or-Nothing Approach to ABC 
Corporation Scenario 
Plaintiffs Experience Chance of Remedy 
Obtaining Job 
Plaintiff A Extensive 52% 100% of 
Value of 
Job 
Plaintiff B Moderate 16% 0% 
Plaintiff C Minimal 8% 0% 
D. Preliminary Conclusions Regarding the Public Interest Model 
In reviewing the results of the hypothetical discussed above, three 
preliminary conclusions are possible. First, the public interest approach 
to lost chance theory represents a principled compromise for meeting the 
sometimes contradictory public and private aims of employment 
discrimination law. 254 As a compromise to these sometimes intractable 
issues, it will hopefully satisfy, to some extent, both law and economic 
adherents who focus on proper deterrence and allocation of resources, 255 
as well as those who favor the relative simplicity of the traditional ali-
or-nothing approach. 
Second, and as a result of the factual circumstances surrounding the 
254. See Truckor, supra note 17, at 373 (describing the lost chance approach as 
a compromise between the aU-or-nothing approach and relaxed causation approach). 
255. See supra note 25. 
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hypothetical example, notice that under the public interest model, the 
employer ends up paying a total of 116% of the value of the job for 
which it discriminatorily selected the white candidate, as compared to 
100% under the ali-or-nothing approach.256 This additional 16% of 
compensation can be viewed as a punitive-type of equitable relief 
awarded to the plaintiffs in order to support the public goals of 
employment discrimination law, 257 as well as at least symbolically 
making the employer acknowledge that its own bad conduct caused not 
only victim specific damage, but harm to society in general. 258 · 
Third, and finally, the valuation process, as demonstrated above, 
remains more of an exercise in approximation rather than an attempt to 
arrive at a mathematically pure figure. Nevertheless, and as discussed 
by other jurists and commentators,259 this fact alone should not 
undermine lost chance theory as a viable way of justly compensating 
those who have suffered at the hands of a discriminatory employer.260 
Indeed, such an approach is a modem day slicing of the Gordian Knot; 
256. Interestingly, the pure lost chance model leads to the undercompensation of 
all three plaintiffs by a total of 8% because of the fact that one black employee did not 
join in the lawsuit against the employer. See supra tbi.C. This result again suggests 
that a mandatory joinder motion under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be utilized to prevent systemic undercompensation in pure lost chance theory 
cases. See supra note 156 (discussing the advantages of a Rule 19 motion in this 
context). 
257. In this regard, although the ali-or-nothing approach is successful in 
providing meaningful "make whole" relief for one of the plaintiffs, it ignores the fact 
that the employer's conduct also had a more than a de minimis impact on Plaintiff B. 
See Wax, supra note 5, at 1214. As Amy Wax wrote: "If race or sex is found to be the 
'determinative' cause of an adverse employment action, then the victim obtains a full 
'make whole' measure of relief. If that finding is not made, the claimant gets nothing." 
/d. Thus, one of the chief advantages of the public interest model over the ali-or-
nothing approach is that it does not completely ignore reprehensible conduct against one 
of the plaintiffs as though it never happened. See supra note 48, 51. 
258. And thus, overcoming the current overemphasis on monetary relief in these 
types of cases. See Selmi, supra note 21, at 1251-52. 
259. See Bishop, 212 F.3d at 1016 (observing that lost chance calculations are 
more art than science); Aagaard, supra note 49, at 1350 (arguing for a discretionary 
approach to valuing the loss of chances). 
260. See Doll, 15 F.3d at 1206-07. As the court stated in Doll: 
It would be hard to pick a number that would reliably estimate the 
probability of Doll's receiving the promotion but for discrimination. Would 
it be 5 percent? 10 percent? 40 percent? Who knows? Yet no less 
uncertainty attends the efforts of triers of fact to fix the percentage of a 
plaintiffs negligence in a tort case governed, as most tort cases are today, by 
the rule of comparative negligence. 
!d.; see, e.g., Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding an 
allocation of 97% of the fault to the plaintiff). If the uncertainty is bearable there, 
why is it not bearable in an employment case? The unarticulated, unacknowledged 
difference-splitting that the plaintiff thinks the judge engaged in here does not 
appear to be a superior approach. 
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that is, it represents the most bold and energetic remedial method for 
comprehensively meeting the two central statutory purposes of 
employment discrimination law. 261 
The public interest model to lost chance for probabilistic injuries in 
employment discrimination cases adopted in this Article represents the 
best accommodation of the public and private interests sought to be 
advanced by employment discrimination law. On one hand, it provides 
compensation for those who have been wronged and would receive no 
recovery under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach. 262 On the other 
hand, this approach serves the public interest by awarding punitive-like 
equitable relief to employees who had a better-than-even chance of 
receiving a position in the absence of discrimination, thereby furthering 
the public goal of eradicating all forms of discrimination from the 
workplace. 263 
V. CONCLUSION 
Applying lost chance theory to probabilistic injuries in competitive 
hiring and promotion cases in the employment discrimination context 
generally leads to more just and equitable results than any other 
remedial scheme. Nevertheless, this Article seeks to amend the pure 
lost chance theory approach advocated elsewhere with the public interest 
model. Under this public interest model, lost chance theory is applied 
only to not-better-than-even-chance employment discrimination cases 
with at least a 10% loss of chance of initially obtaining a competitive 
position. At the same time, the traditional ali-or-nothing approach 
continues to apply to better-than-even-chance cases. The benefit to be 
gained from this hybrid approach is that the public interest goals 
underlying employment discrimination law will again be appropriately 
given prominence. To the extent that overcompensation results because 
of this remedial scheme, such additional compensation should be seen as 
a punitive-like equitable remedy, necessary to effectuate the broader 
public policy mandate of federal employment discrimination law: to 
eradicate unlawful employment discrimination throughout the economy. 
261. See supra note 140. 
262. In the hypothetical, Plaintiff B represents the plaintiff who would be 
otherwise undercompensated under the traditional ali-or-nothing approach. Compare 
supra tbi.B, with supra tbi.D. 
263. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text. 
